Public Administration History

A Public Voices Symposium

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Public Administration History

A Symposium of *Public Voices*

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Contents

Cover Art
In March of 1933, President Franklin D. Roosevelt established the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC), one of many social programs to provide unemployment relief during the Great Depression and to develop rural areas of the United States. The CCC provided employment to over 3 million young, unmarried men across the United States during the nine years it was in existence. By 1942, with the outbreak of World War II, most young unmarried men were serving in the military and the CCC program came to an end. The cover poster from the State of Illinois is representative of New Deal poster art.

History: The Invisible Present of Public Administration ..... 1

Introduction by Mark Rutgers and Larry Luton

The symposium editors explain the need for a deeper understanding of public administration's history and look at

Justices Of The Peace In Stuart England ................. 7

Michael Spicer

American public administration has tended to neglect its historical roots in English administrative practice. This article examines the administrative practice of justices of the peace in
Stuart England. It is argued here that the practice of the Stuart justices exhibited an independence from central control by the crown and also a legalistic character, both of which have been important in shaping later American administrative practice.

The Prince, His Welfare State, and its Administration .... 29

Mark Rutgers

The philosophy of Christian Von Wolff (1679-1754) provided the foundations for administrative thought throughout the eighteenth century. He is an important representative of the idea the Enlightened State. It is surprising that an author so fundamental for the development of the administrative discourse has become so completely forgotten in the history of the field. Due to the philosopher Immanuel Kant, Wolff became a reviled and forgotten author. It can, however, be argued that Wolff lays the foundations for liberal ideas in the 19th century and many present-day concepts in the field. His work learns that the idea of public administration roots in a more comprehensive philosophy on state and society.

Administrative Leadership And Social Change ............ 47

Larry Luton

Although the history of public administration has not received the attention it deserves, leadership is a topic that has enjoyed periodic bursts of attention among those who are concerned with issues related to governance, management, and administration. Most often these treatments of leadership focus on leadership within an organizational structure, within a corporation or a bureaucracy. This article adds to the literature on administrative leadership by examining examples of the leadership of public administrators in a larger context, in social movements. Public administrators focused on in this article include: John Wesley Powell, Gifford Pinchot, Aldo Leopold.
Public Administration in the Social Reform Movement . . . 69

M. Curtis Hoffman

At the start of the 20th century, social reform competed with structural reform for the hearts and minds of urban reformers. Public administration scholarship has long recognized PA’s roots in the structural reform tradition. In contrast, PA’s relationship to the social reform tradition has remained obscure. This exploration in the history of ideas shows that social reform rejected many principles upon which public administration now rests, and advanced many alternative concepts in their stead.
History: The Invisible Present of Public Administration

Mark R. Rutgers and Larry S. Luton

We need to improve our understanding of the history of public administration—but not because it is impossible to manage public affairs without an improved understanding. Obviously, it is possible to address present-day problems in public administration without historic awareness. In fact, describing the field of public administration as having an ahistorical perspective is common (e.g., Adams, 1992; Schacter, 1998; Luton, 1999, p. 205). However, there is a growing awareness that in order to better resolve contemporary issues in public administration, their origins need to be addressed.

Fortunately, there is a new interest in the history of public administration. Books on public administration history are being published (e.g., Spicer, 1995; Wamsley and Wolf, 1998; Raadschelders, 1998). Other journals are publishing history-related articles; Administrative Theory and Praxis published a symposium on public administration history in 1998. Public Voices has also previously participated in recognizing the new interest in history, when it featured the topic of “Insights from History and Political Thought” in Volume II, Issue 1 (1996). SHARE, the American Society for Public Administration’s Section on Humanistic, Artistic, and Reflective Expression, for which Public Voices serves as the journal, has recently adopted a name change (now Historic, Artistic, and Reflective Expression) to indicate that the section and the journal see themselves as centers for the encouragement of work on the history of public administration. This symposium is the first result of that new mission.
The new interest in history in the US study of public administration was enlivened by celebration of the 100th anniversary of Wilson's 1887 essay and has been most directly evidenced in the field's debates on the relation between the Constitution and public administration. Discussions regarding the intentions of the founding fathers and whether they adequately envisaged administrative arrangements have resulted in a number of studies (e.g., Rohr, 1986; Chandler, 1987; Stillman, 1989; Spicer and Terry, 1993; Luton, 1994; Spicer, 1995; Wamsley and Wolf, 1996). Clearly, additional research can aid our interpretation of the founding fathers and their possible relevance for the present (see for example, Beach, et al, 1997).

One valuable contribution of studying public administration history is the way that knowledge can help us overcome simplistic ideas about how administrative arrangements came to be. Administrative arrangements for providing postal service provide an interesting example of how improved understanding of history might provide improved perspective in addressing contemporary problems. Government control of postal services was instituted in almost all Western countries in the 18th century. Government control in this field is taken for granted by most Americans. However, in many European countries postal services have been privatized in the past decade. Why were postal services 'nationalized' in the first place? Among the reasons were: 1) safeguarding of secrecy, and 2) ensuring fair pricing throughout the nation. In short, there were social considerations involved. Apparently, some Western countries have decided either that these kinds of social considerations can be resolved without resorting to nationalization, or that the original reasons no longer apply. In order to assess the pros and cons of differing approaches to delivering the mail, the original reasons for government-controlled postal services have to be taken into account. What could be gained or lost by changing our administrative arrangements? Are the circumstances similar, or are they sufficiently different to expect better results from the same kind of administrative arrangements that once failed to meet our expectations?

Many 'taken for granted' assumptions can only be appreciated, or even made visible, from a historic perspective: this is what 'putting things in perspective' is all about. Too often, it is forgotten how our lives are governed by 'old ideas'. It may be surprising how far 'modern' phenomena date back; for instance, our time scheme dividing
the day in hours and minutes is 5000 years old. Old ideas also can be corrupted (or at least severely restricted in meaning) over time. Public administration’s use of the concept of rationality is one example of that phenomenon (Rutgers, 1999).

For understanding the complexities of our present-day administration, a historical perspective is necessary; history in a sense constitutes our ‘invisible present’—an aspect of our present that we too often fail to recognize. And that is a theme linking the contributions in this symposium.

One of the ‘invisibles’ in American administrative understanding concerns its pre-Wilsonian, or most certainly, pre-Revolutionary legacy (cf. Luton, 1999: 216). Two of the articles in this symposium address this issue; they both point to roots of American administrative thought that precede the birth of the US. Spicer traces ‘modern’ sentiments and approaches in American public administration back to the Stuart Justices of the Peace. He illustrates how some practices and ideas are a ‘way of life’ (i.e., a ‘way of administration’) that cannot be discarded easily and need to be taken into account when ‘modernizing’ administration. If we want to understand why certain approaches have come to be preferred, then we need more research like that done by Spicer. In Rutgers article another kind of ‘invisible present’ is laid bare. Many of our ‘taken for granted’ starting points have been the subjects of significant debates. As Rutgers shows, some of these starting points are not so obvious—for example, that public administration is concerned with social well being.

Turning to the Wilsonian and its Progressive Era legacies, two articles pinpoint other ‘invisble presents’ in American administrative thought. Hoffman counters the tendency to focus on ‘main stream’ legacies by presenting an alternative, local approach to public administration that was also part of the Progressive Era. Ideas similar to those of the Cleveland social reformers continue to shape public administration, and the field needs to recognize that part of the Progressive legacy. Similarly, Luton uses a biographical approach to administrative history to present evidence of a much richer and broader administrative tradition than is generally acknowledged. The traditional view of public administrators as uninvolved in significant social and political change is a deliberately constructed public administration narrative, but it is not accurately descriptive of actual administrative practice.
Not only do the articles in this symposium cover several centuries, the authors also exemplify different approaches that can aid in unraveling our legacies—tracing the nature and development of a specific administrative arrangement (justice of the peace), the legacy of a particular theorist (Von Seckendorff), the development of an administrative ideology in a particular time and place (the Cleveland social reformers), and the roles of natural resource administrators over more than a century (Powell, Pinchot, Leopold and Carson). In all cases 'taken for granted' ideas about present-day public administration are at stake. In all cases 'invisible' forces shaping contemporary administrative practices are made visible. The contributions to this symposium show that administrative phenomena and ideas have very old, often surprisingly persistent roots. The contributions also raise questions about self-evident ideas by upsetting simple ideas about the position of public administration in society (both in theory and in practice).

Perhaps, the growing interest in the history of public administration—a phenomenon that is taking place not just in the US, but also in Europe—indicates that the field is increasingly aware that public administration is a cultural, and thus historically developed, phenomenon. It shows that over-generalizing, more or less obligatory textbook introductions to the history of the field hinder the development of an adequate understanding of the phenomenon of public administration: we need more studies like those presented in this symposium in order to get a more detailed, and colorful picture. We cannot really know the present without knowing how we arrived at it. We cannot sufficiently understand the present until we bring into view the historical influences that have heretofore remained invisible.

References


Justices Of The Peace In Stuart England
And American Public Administration

Michael W. Spicer

American public administration has its roots in early English traditions of practice. However, writers in American public administration have generally not drawn upon these traditions in thinking about what constitutes good public administration. Indeed, Woodrow Wilson believed that the influence of English traditions on American public administration was more a burden to be discarded or a problem to be remedied than a heritage to be explored. "The English race," according to Wilson, had "long and successfully studied the art of curbing executive power to the constant neglect of the art of perfecting executive methods" (1887, 206). English and American political history had been, in Wilson's view, neither a history of "administrative development" nor a history of "progress in governmental organization" (206). He saw much more to be gained by examining Continental rather than English practices of administration. Wilson observed that "the English system is too much like our own to be used to the most profit in illustration" (219). He believed it "best on the whole to get entirely away from our own atmosphere and to be most careful in examining such systems as those of France and Germany" (219).

However, the recent growth of the literature on the constitutional heritage of public administration, sparked by the work of John Rohr (1986) and others, suggests that we may in fact "profit" by examining English traditions of administrative practice more closely. The American Constitution, after all, while innovative in several aspects, drew heavily from English custom and practice. According to Wilson himself, "the political institutions of the United States are in all
their main features simply the political institutions of England, as transplanted by English colonists...worked out through a fresh development to new and characteristic forms" (1889, 449). Lynton Caldwell has observed more recently that "the 18th century legacy of colonial political ideas was drawn selectively from an earlier England—from the constitutional disputes of the 17th century Civil War and Commonwealth" (1976, 479). Also, in Richard Stillman's view, "The U.S. Constitution essentially both revitalized and rearranged old, but dying English Tudor institutional customs of fundamental law and balanced government" (1991, 27). If we are serious, therefore, about developing an approach to public administration that is more consonant with our own constitutional traditions, it makes sense, in light of the English roots of our Constitution, to look at English traditions of administrative practice more closely. Such an examination can perhaps help us 1) better understand our own administrative practice and 2) guide our own thinking with respect to improvements in that practice.

This article seeks to examine one of the more important sets of actors in the historical development of the English practice of public administration, namely the county justices of the peace. The importance of these officials is supported by G.M. Trevelyan's observation that, by the Elizabethan era, the justices of the peace were "the most influential class of men in England" (1942a, 171). Particular attention will be paid here to the practices of justices in the seventeenth century. It was during this period that the English began to colonize America in significant numbers, bringing with them the governmental customs and practices of their homeland. Also, during this period, the English political and constitutional ideas, which were to so profoundly influence the American Revolution, began to crystallize and take on a clear form, as expressed at the end of the century in the writings of John Locke. Following a brief history and description of the office of the justice of the peace, this article will focus upon those aspects of the justices' practices which seem to be most salient to American public administration. It is argued here that the practice of the Stuart justices exhibited 1) an independence from central control and 2) a legalistic character, both of which have been important in shaping later American administrative practice.
The Office of Justice of the Peace

The office of justice of the peace was originally established by Edward III during the fourteenth century as a means of increasing his power and authority over his kingdom (Beard, 1904). This period of English history was one of exceptional lawlessness encouraged by a variety of factors including the dethronement of Edward's father, various disputes between feudal lords, soldiers returning from bloody wars in Europe, and, of course, the Black Death. Charles Beard noted, in his history of the justices, that local officials simply "were unable to cope with the wide-spread and persistent social anarchy" and both the king and parliament became convinced of "the necessity for a regular and permanent centralized administration" (1904, 35). In a 1360 statute, it was, therefore, established that "in every county of England shall be assigned for the keeping of the peace, one lord and with him three or four of the most worthy in the county, with some learned in the law" (Beard 1904, 40-41). Combining both police and judicial powers, these officials were authorized, among other things,

- to restrain the offenders, rioters, and all other barators, and to pursue, arrest, take, and chastise them according to their trespass or offense; and to cause them to be imprisoned and duly punished according to the law and customs of the realm, and according to that which to them shall seem best to do by their discretions and good advisement. (Beard, 1904, 41)

It is worth noting here that justices of the peace were to be appointed by the monarch, a power which Edward and later monarchs held on to quite firmly despite repeated attempts by Parliament to allow local or parliamentary election of justices. Furthermore, the justices were unpaid and were recruited largely from the rural, landowning middle classes. The intent here was to undercut the power of the great feudal lords, while avoiding the expense of the type of large professional bureaucracies employed by Continental monarchs. The king sought to coopt the gentry into his administration so that he would "have his own agents throughout the realm" as "an alternative to hired bureaucratic officials" (Dibble, 1965, 884).

Following their establishment, the justices' jurisdiction and responsibilities were gradually but continually expanded. Their increasing responsibilities in enforcing a growing range of statutes reflected the
increase in monarchical power over the same period of time. This was especially true of the Tudor era in which governments pursuing mercantilist economic policies assumed much greater responsibilities, not only for maintaining order, but also for the detailed regulation of industry and trade and for the care of the poor. The justices became Queen Elizabeth's "maids of all work" (Trevelyon, 1942a, 169).

As a result, by the beginning of the 17th century, the justices of the peace were far more than simply a hybrid of policemen and lower magistrates. They had become, in fact, the preeminent officials of county government and they remained so throughout the 17th century, except for a brief interval during Oliver Cromwell's military rule. Acting sometimes as an entire body but more often in smaller groups and sometimes even alone, they served as general-purpose administrators for the county, for the most part overseeing and prodding lesser officials. They were involved not only in keeping the peace, but in a myriad of other administrative activities. Such activities included regulating weights and measures, collecting taxes, repairing roads and bridges, inspecting drainage, supervising poor relief, impressing conscripts into military service, setting wages and enforcing wage contracts, controlling prices, enforcing apprenticeship requirements for the various trades, distributing military pensions, supervising the wool trade, and licensing and inspecting alehouses. The justices also paid off informers, suppressed vice and illegal games such as skittles and shuffleboard, enforced church attendance, and harassed Catholics and, later on, other groups of nonconformists. In short, the justices provided the administrative apparatus by which increasingly powerful monarchs sought to intervene in nearly every aspect of the lives of their subjects. They received a stream of orders, instructions, and assignments from the Privy Council, the central administrative body in London, and they in turn informed the Council of any serious troubles in their jurisdiction.

However, the justices were not simply the passive instruments of London. They often responded on their own initiative to local grievances and complaints and they expressed the concerns and the interests of the county to London. As William Bradford Willcox noted, "From the point of view of the central government, they were instruments for almost any task" but, "from the point of view of the peo-
ple," they were also "policemen, judges and general advisers to the neighborhood" as well as "spokesmen for the county" (1940, 55).

The most visible aspect of the work of a justice of the peace was in presiding over the quarter sessions of the county along with those of his fellow justices who chose to attend. These were held with some ceremony in January, April, July, and October for two to three days either at one town in the county, where this was convenient, or alternating between several different towns where this was not. Here, the justices, in their judicial work, would as a rule deal with minor breaches of the law including petty larceny, assaults, forcible entries upon land, sheep-stealing, housebreaking, trespass, and, of course, witchcraft. More serious crimes were usually left to the visiting judges at the assizes to handle. In addition, they were frequently drawn into what amounted to civil actions which they often settled through a process of arbitration. Like modern American city managers who are called upon to deal with barking dog complaints, the justices often found themselves drawn into a variety of petty disputes in the village. Wallace Notestein has provided a vivid picture of the character of some of these disputes.

Two men quarrelled and were bound over to keep the peace and presently released, but went on bickering until something had to be done. Two yeomen had a difference about the ownership of a lamb. Seventeen harvesters declared that they had not been paid for reaping, shearing, and inn ing the corn grown on a baronet's land... [A] woman had spoken ill of her mother-in-law; another woman by her great show of overmuch familiarity toward men in the parish had bred disquiet between them and their wives; a man had delighted more to sing ungodly songs in the alehouse than to hear the word of God in church (1954, 217-218).

Quarter sessions also involved the discussion of administrative business. According to Anthony Fletcher, "staple items" of the justices' administrative agenda included "the poor law, apprenticeship, bastardy cases, the regulation of alehouses, local taxation, bridges and highways and the management of the gaol and houses of correction" (1986, 89). However, because of the considerable time taken by criminal trials, justices were limited in their ability to deal with detailed administrative matters at quarter sessions and they were forced to act here largely as a coordinating body, discussing and setting gen-
eral policy for justices, acting outside of quarter sessions (Barnes, 1961, 67-79). They also served as a board of appeals for those citizens wishing to contest the administrative actions of justices.

It is important to note here that judicial and administrative matters were often mixed together in quarter sessions. Some administrative matters, for example, a failure to repair highways and bridges, might come to light as a result of criminal actions against those persons considered responsible (Fletcher, 1986, 88-89). Also, grand juries at the quarter sessions, in addition to presenting indictments against defendants, served as a means of airing grievances against all kinds of government policies and their administration. In the seventeenth century, they became, as Fletcher has observed, "informants at sessions about matters seen to be of general import" (1986, 165). Quarter sessions served in this way, as Lawrence Stone noted, not simply as a court of law, but as a local parliament in which "the leading men of the county met at intervals to do business and also to express their sense of county solidarity by the formulation of Country grievances against the Court" (Stone, 1972, 107).

The Independence Of Justices In Administration

While the justices were agents of the crown, they also often exhibited considerable independence or autonomy in the exercise of their responsibilities. Most visible, of course, was the opposition of many of them to the attempts by Charles I to raise money without parliamentary approval. Good accounts of the opposition to various royal taxes and the role played by local justices of the peace in leading this opposition have been provided by Wilcox (1840) and by Thomas Garden Barnes (1961). Wilcox described, in the case of ship money, a levy used to support the navy, how six Gloucestershire justices "refused point blank to pay the tax, or to help in any way with its collection" (1840, 128). Barnes described how, in Somerset, the leadership of justices and other prominent men in the county was central in mounting a series of disputes over ship money ratings or assessments. He noted that, with respect to ship money assessments, Somerset had "the distinction of troubling the Privy Council more... than any other county" (1961, 213). But not all justices were so bold as to publicly oppose the king. Opposition to royal taxation frequently took a more subtle form. As Vernon Dibble observed, "It was..."
safer to hedge,...to ally with the local yeomanry in claiming that their parish has been overtaxed, without challenging the king’s right to extra-parliamentary taxes” (1965, 905). Similarly, Fletcher has noted that royal attempts to raise money through unpopular taxes “were to one degree or another simply quietly obstructed” (1986, 356).

The independence exercised by justices of the peace was by no means confined to issues of taxation. For example, the 1563 Statute of Artificers mandated apprenticeships for entry into a variety of different occupations and trades, but, according to Margaret Davies (1956), local authorities were often indifferent to evasions of the apprenticeship law. The law was enforced “only when it met an urgent need of the community or was in harmony with strong public sentiment” (Davies, 1956, 162). Justices of the peace were often unwilling to strictly enforce the law where they believed that it would result in unemployment and higher claims on poor relief. For example, in a 1634 case brought by the drapers of Preston in Lancashire against allegedly unapprenticed competitors in nearby villages, three justices ruled that “the several trades are rather to be continued... than suppressed... for that many thereby purchase relief for themselves and families where otherwise they would live very poorly or be cast on the country” (Davies, 1956, 226).

Gloustershire justices also exercised autonomy in enforcing economic regulations imposed by the central government (Willcox, 1940). For example, when the Privy Council in the 1630s issued a series of orders to justices to help suppress the illegal domestic tobacco trade, these orders were ignored and justices failed to punish rioters who resisted attempts to destroy stores of tobacco. According to Willcox,

The countryman felt entitled to his crop, regardless of its legality, and he was not inclined to stand by and see it uprooted by a ‘foreigner’ from London. The justices and constables doubtless sympathized with this point of view, and they were notably unimpressed by letters and warrants from the council (1940, 161).

The willingness of the Gloustershire justices to support local interests against Privy Council orders was further shown in 1633 when local clothiers petitioned against a Privy Council ban on the use of
Michael W. Spicer

mozing mills in the wool trade. This petition, as Willcox noted, "was accompanied by a letter from the local justices, who were nervous about the projected ban" (1940, 169). More generally, Anthony Fletcher has argued that justices of the peace enforced laws more or less strictly according to their own interests and their own view of the county's interests. In Fletcher's view,

The pace of government was the pace set by the local justices. The standards imposed were the standards they found acceptable and to which they could obtain a response from leading villagers. In the last resort the standards achieved were those they were sufficiently troubled to enforce (1986, 142).

Justices of the peace also exercised independence in following the directives of Charles I's "Book of Orders" which attempted to impose a common set of national priorities with respect to social, economic, and disciplinary policy. This attempt by Charles' officials to impose "a common set of priorities, a national agenda for magisterial effort" on the justices was not surprisingly resented by many of them (Fletcher, 1986, 57). These justices, according to Fletcher, "believed they knew their own counties, the needs of their countrymen and the most glaring deficiencies of their subordinates better than anyone in London" and they did not see why every county should "be hustled into uniformity" (1986, 57).

To aid in the enforcement of national priorities, the Book required that justices write quarterly reports on their administration of laws to London. However, there is considerable evidence that the justices were less than forthcoming in providing information to the Privy Council. Reporting was "both patchy and spasmodic" and the reports "quickly became stereotyped" and "stylized," taking "a bland and uninformative approach" as a "defense against conciliar prying" (Fletcher, 1986, 58). In an extract from one report, cited by Barnes, the justices of Somerset informed the Privy Council that

"wee shall not henceforth have cause to trouble you or ourselves with long certificates. For at our present meetinge wee finde that the presentments ... within our division affordes noe particulars worthie certifying untoe their lordshipes (Barnes, 1961, 184)."
Moreover, Barnes described how three divisions in Somerset submitted identical, curt reports which provided “a mere recitation of the various clauses of the Book of Orders, preceded by ‘we have done our best’” (Barnes, 1961, 184). According to Barnes, the justices’ reports were at best a table of apprenticeships bound, vagrants punished, drunkards fined, etc. and at worst an omnia bene decorated with verbiage” (1961, 184).

In addition, while the Book did prompt some initiatives in some counties, for example, to get more poor children apprenticed, to check unlicensed alehouses, and to control vagrancy, these initiatives tended to be short-lived (Fletcher 1986, 59). It is probably true that the Book did encourage a greater uniformity in procedure, most notably in promoting the justice’s use of “divisional sessions” or “petty sessions” to conduct their business out of quarter sessions. However, it apparently did little in the long run to change the justices’ administrative priorities or to reduce their independence. Indeed, Thomas Skyrme has suggested that the Book of Orders “fell far short of making the impact that was intended” and that its failure “hastened the end of the Crown’s attempt to modify the justices’ independence” (1994, 303).

All this is not to suggest that the interests of the central government were always at variance with those of the justices of the peace. To the contrary, both the Privy Council and the justices were clearly very concerned and arguably obsessed with the need to maintain peace and order in the counties. However, the justices were not always willing to accept the current policy priorities of central government and the methods which they used to address them were not always those prescribed. As Fletcher has noted, “Policies that rested on consensus—regarding alehouses, dearth or vagrancy, for example,” were enforced, but “they were only enforced at the pace that each county bench judged to be necessary” (356).

This control of the pace of administration was also evidenced in the administration of the Poor Law. While a 1597 statute mandated financial relief to the poor to be paid out of local poor rates, many justices, seeking to avoid the imposition of unwelcome new tax burdens, were slow to pressure parishes to levy these rates. They preferred to rely instead on voluntary alms and, in some cases, they even delayed the imposition of rates by issuing licenses to beg. However, as the plight of the poor worsened during a series of periodic
food shortages in the first half of the century, more and more justices ordered the imposition of rates so that poor relief became more general. "The final establishment of the poor rate" was, in Fletcher's words, "a triumph of local initiative, a response to felt need" (187).

But the justices of the peace did not always exercise their discretion simply to slow down or to dilute the implementation of central government policies. In fact, the justices responded quite proactively in dealing with severe food shortages in the late 1640s despite the absence at that time of any central directives or pressures to intervene (Fletcher, 1986, 199). In the county of Wiltshire, for example, justices sought to increase the food supply by restricting the purchase of barley to make ale by the county's most active maltster. The justices also mandated the public display and sale of all corn and they secured an agreement from farmers to reserve a portion of their barley for sale to the poor at a fixed price. Fletcher has cited the nationwide absence of grain riots during these food shortages as evidence of effective action by the justices. In his view, "material from a number of counties suggests that the magistracy coped triumphantly" (Fletcher, 1986, 199).

**Limits On Central Control**

The independence exercised by justices was a frequent source of frustration for both the king and his ministers. However, a number of factors operated to limit the control that central authorities could exercise over justices. Firstly, justices of the peace were unpaid and essentially amateur officials. As such, it was the justices rather than the central authorities who owned and controlled the resources of administration (Dibble, 1965). They paid for their own pen, paper, and ink and they employed their own private clerks. More importantly, while the office of justice of the peace conveyed a certain prestige to the holder, the justices, as local gentry in their communities, enjoyed a position of prestige and influence which was quite independent of their official office. As Dibble noted, in accepting office, "they placed at the disposal of the crown a system of social relations in which they were already superiors, independently of their official tenure" (1965, 885). One important consequence of this was that justices were able to limit centralized control of the appointments process. While the crown formally selected justices, it typically did so on the basis of nominations made by the more prestigious men in the county including its existing justices. According to Dibble, most just-
 justices "were first appointed because they had the requisite wealth, local reputation, and style of life, and because they were the relatives, friends, or adherents of justices more powerful than they" (1965, 885). As a result, "justices were one another's friends or rivals, business associates, neighbors, and kin" (Dibble, 1965, 885). Family ties were especially important and familiar names constantly reoccur in county records (Gleason, 1969).

Furthermore, once appointed, justices were usually not removed except for reasons of age, illness, or laziness. While there were periodic purges of justices who expressed opposition to the crown's policies, these individuals were almost always restored to office. According to J.H. Gleason, this was because there was "a limited group of men who were well qualified for appointment as J.P." (1969, 82). Dibble confirmed this when he observed that the sanction of dismissal against justices "was almost never applied" because "the crown was too dependent upon local worthies" and the pool of replacements was "limited by local control of nominations" (1965, 889). The justices then, as members of the county gentry, were able to limit the power of the monarch over their selection and dismissal. In this regard, it should be noted that James II's inability to persuade the gentry to serve as justices, following a wholesale purge of the bench, has been credited with contributing to his removal from the throne in 1688 during the Glorious Revolution.

Another important limit on central control was the nature of the work conducted by the justices. While it was certainly possible to supervise the activities of justices at quarter sessions, only about a quarter of them actually attended these sessions. Also, justices increasingly did most of their work not in quarter sessions, but rather in petty sessions or "out of sessions" altogether, acting either alone or in concert with other justices. As a result, an official written record of the justices' actions was not always available. As Dibble put it, their working conditions were such that justices were often placed "beyond the close control of higher authorities" (1961, 890). The informality with which justices often conducted their business out of sessions served to further limit central control of their activities. Justices frequently acted outside of their courts as mediators in disputes arising in their counties. As Willcox noted, in Gloucestershire, "a great deal was done outside, in quieter ways which have left no record, by bullying and cajoling, by letters to London, by rough diplomacy over the beer glass" (1940, 72). Fletcher has noted
similarly the existence of a “tradition of magisterial reconciliation and arbitration” which was “well developed in the Stuart period” (30). This informal style of conducting administration and justice meant that many of the activities of justices inevitably remained invisible to the Privy Council.

A further limit to central control of the justices arose from the way in which the controlling authorities themselves conducted their business. According to Davies, for example, there was a “lack of effort by the central government to chart a consistent policy or to set objectives for the local authorities in enforcing apprenticeship” (1956, 239). Similarly, Fletcher has observed that the king’s Privy Council never served as an effective body for the administration of court policy. According to Fletcher,

There was little control over the flow of business, much of which ... was unsought. There was always too much to be done and ... little opportunity to develop any notion of policy. Decisions were taken singly and without cross-referencing. As a result, correspondence with particular counties revealed a lack of continuous attention and sometimes even contradicted itself (1986, 44).

Consequently, the Council “could never cope with the enforcement of more than one major policy at a time” (Fletcher, 1986, 46) and “found it difficult to stick to particular policies for any length of time” (52). This is illustrated in the previously mentioned Book of Orders which was designed to prod the justices into paying more attention to particular areas of social, economic, and disciplinary policy that the Council saw as important. In Fletcher’s view, the Council never gave the Book sustained regular attention and it “failed not so much because it was openly resisted as because it was not properly enforced” (57). For example, the Council itself undercut the effectiveness of the mandatory system of quarterly reports from justices when, in December 1632, it indicated that henceforth it would rely on an abstract of divisional reports rather than personally reviewing the reports of the justices themselves (Fletcher, 1986, 57).

It is true that efforts were made by the Privy Council to exercise more control over the justices by having the visiting judges of assizes supervise their work more closely. However, the judges proved not to be a very effective tool for the Council in supervising and controlling
the administrative activities of the justices. Their visits to particular counties were simply too infrequent and too short to allow them to exercise effective administrative oversight. Furthermore, there is evidence that many of the judges did not exercise their supervisory responsibilities with much zeal. The judges saw themselves “as dignitaries who deserved to be feasted and expected gifts” and they “were not for the most part interested in being reformers” (Fletcher, 1986, 50). They saw their role “in terms of occasional imperious interventions rather than sustained attention to local politics,” and they lacked “the will and the inclination to become an intendency” (Fletcher, 1986, 51-52).

The crown’s control over the administrative activities of its justices was, therefore, constrained by its practice of recruiting unpaid administrators from the country gentry, by the lack of visibility of much of the work of the justices, and by both the inability and unwillingness of central officials to set and to enforce a consistent set of central priorities. As a result, the effectiveness of Stuart monarchical governance hinged largely on the willingness of local justices themselves to carry out the policies of the Crown. This did not as a rule paralyze the Stuart governments but it did set definite limits to what they could accomplish.

The Legalistic Character of the Justices’ Administration

Notwithstanding the aforementioned informality with which justices often handled their work, the historical evidence also suggests that the practices of the justices were profoundly affected by the law and its mechanisms, so that their administrative actions took on a distinctly legalistic character. In applying and interpreting the numerous statutes handed down from London, the Stuart justices, like their predecessors, employed the principles of the common law that had been built up over the preceding centuries. They saw their responsibilities here primarily in terms of maintaining the peace through the enforcement of law rather than helping the crown achieve its particular policy objectives efficiently and effectively. Furthermore, the justices conducted their formal administrative business by means of medieval common law processes and instruments, including juries, presentments, and indictments. Indeed, in the absence of a paid professional bureaucracy, it was only through
the law and its machinery that the justices could exercise formal control over the actions of constables, parish overseers, surveyors, and other local officials. William Holdsworth, a prominent English legal scholar of the early twentieth century, best captured the legalistic character of the justices' administration when he observed that the justices were “inspired, not by the ideas of a department of the central government, but by the ideas of the common law, which they applied through the judicial machinery of the law” (Holdsworth, 1967, 59).

The legalistic character of public administration under the justices of the peace is suggested in the text of the popular handbooks written for justices of the time, most notably William Lambard's Eirenarchia, first published in 1558, and Michael Dalton's The Country Justice, first published in 1622. These handbooks are useful in providing some indication as to how the justices themselves saw their responsibilities, at least in idealized terms. Both handbooks emphasized the centrality of the law to the justices' responsibilities. Lambard noted how the justice of the peace should "containe himself within the lists of law" and "use his owne Discretion, but onely where both the law permiteth, and the present case requireth it" (55). Dalton, in a similar vein, argued that justices should not act "according to their own wils and affections" (1972, 5), but rather according to "the lawes, customes, and statutes of this realme, without respect of persons" (4). Dalton here expressed his reverence for the common law when he asserted that there was no other law "within the circuit of the whole world ... so apt and profitable, for the honorable, peaceable, and prosperous government of this Kingdome" (1972, 1). Both Lambard's and Dalton's handbooks addressed themselves to the justices' work out of sessions, Dalton's work exclusively so. However, they offered no managerial advice at all to their fellow justices. Instead, what was provided was essentially an enumeration of the legal powers of the justices and the legal procedures that were to be followed in exercising those powers.

The legalistic character of administration under the justices was reflected in and also undoubtedly influenced by their education. Justices during the Stuart period, were becoming increasingly educated in the law, at least when compared with their Tudor predecessors. A significant and growing minority of them were actually trained lawyers. Gleason indicated that by 1636, across the six counties he studied, barristers accounted for nearly a quarter of all justices (1969).
Justices Of The Peace In Stuart England

95). Furthermore, in contrast with their Elizabethan predecessors, most Stuart justices received at least some legal education. According to Gleason, "almost all the men who administered English local government had resided for a time in the capital as a member of a legal college" (1969, 94). Here, as Sharp has noted, "they read some law and rubbed shoulders and ate meals with actual and prospective barristers and judges" (1972, 104). The effect of this education in the law on the justices is admittedly difficult to gauge and should not be exaggerated, but, at least in the view of both Gleason and Sharp, it did exert an important influence on their later attitudes and conduct as practicing justices.

While the justices, therefore, were capable of exercising considerable discretion in following the directives of the crown, this discretion was, to a significant degree, shaped and constrained by the legalistic manner in which they were accustomed to conducting their activities. Moreover, the common law and its machinery did more than simply constrain the discretion of the justices. It also helped control the justices in the exercise of their discretion. Indeed, it can be argued that the legalism of the justices' administration was yet another reason why they were able to exercise considerable independence from the crown. Provided that the justices acted according to the law and its procedures, there was little that the Privy Council could do to control their actions. As Holdsworth noted, the "ordinary everyday work" of the justices "was done under judicial forms which left them free to act independently so long as they obeyed the rules of the common law" (59).

The Legacy Of The Stuart Justices

In assessing the legacy of the Stuart justices for public administration, it is important not to paint an overly romantic picture of these men or their actions. Many were undoubtedly incompetent, corrupt, or both; and it must be conceded that even their resistance to Crown policies was motivated often by financial interests as much as constitutional principle. John Nef, in his economic history of the period, clearly expressed this belief when he argued that the justices "combined their private business with the king's service" (1964, 10). Nef critically compared the English justices with their French counterparts, noting that the former "often subordinated the king's interest to their own, by giving sparingly of their time to their official duties," and "by giving a lukewarm response to orders from the privy council
Michael W. Spicer

if these orders interfered with their business projects" (1957, 10). Even in their own time, the justices were frequently the subject of ridicule and satire. Furthermore, judged by contemporary standards, the laws that the justices enforced, such as those against adultery, bastardy, fornication, games, swearing, and vagrancy were undoubtedly often oppressive. Moreover, the sentences that the justices handed out were often cruel and even barbaric. These included public whipping, branding, the cutting-off of ears, stocki ng, pillorying, the ducking-stool, and transportation to the colonies.

However, notwithstanding all of this, there has arisen around the conduct of the justices of the peace within both Britain and the United States a certain image or mythology over the centuries, which, whether true or false, is important to understand in its own right. In particular, the independence exhibited by the justices in responding to royal orders has frequently been characterized as constituting an effective impediment or block to the dictatorial aspirations of the Stuart monarchs. Trevelyan, always notably Whiggish in his outlook, expressed this view most forcefully when he argued that the justices of the Stuart era ensured “the failure of the Stuart Kings to establish a despotism” (1930, 22). According to Trevelyan, the “fate of England” was decided when “magisterial resistance to the Crown” became “one with the resistance of the whole nation” (22). Holdsworth similarly argued that the opposition of the justices to the crown’s policies was “fatal to the success of a scheme of royal absolutism” and also “perhaps the most important cause for the ultimate success of the Parliamentary opposition” (1937, 61). Skyrme observed that the justices “played an important part in curbing royal supremacy and in ensuring that attempts by James I, and particularly Charles I, to establish a dictatorship were unsuccessful” (1994, 296). Even Naf, despite his clearly critical view of the justices, conceded that

The failure of royal absolutism in England is partly explained by the fact that the machinery of government, inherited from the Middle Ages and developed during the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, did not permit the English king as easily as the French king to act counter to the wishes of his chief subjects (1964, 8).

Closely related to this idea, it has also been observed that the legalistic manner in which the justices conducted their affairs contributed
significantly to strengthening English commitment to the idea of the rule of law. Trevelyan, for example, argued that "The respect in which the English held the law was generated not a little by this system of 'amateur justice'" (1942b, 143). Fletcher has suggested that the proceedings of the justices' quarter sessions "embodied and gave expression to a rule of law that made possible the security of property and inheritance and that held together a society that was blantly divided by huge differences of wealth" (1986, 87). Consistent with this, noting the close social linkages between the justices and parliament, many of whose members were justices themselves, Gleason observed that the legal experience of the justices may well have contributed to the "instinct" in English-speaking societies that governments should "act in accordance with the simple phrases but complex notion variously called the rule of law and due process" (1969, 122). According to Gleason, the "legacy" of the Stuart justices was "a legalistic attitude toward social administration" (1969, 122).

**Implications For American Public Administration**

This legacy is not without its significance for American public administration. Indeed, the American colonists and their successors have adopted the tradition of administrative independence, which the Stuart justices helped to protect. Alexis De Tocqueville, for example, was clearly struck by the highly decentralized nature of the system of American public administration that he found in nineteenth-century America. He saw such decentralized administration as an important check on the potential tyranny of majority government. According to Tocqueville, "in the United States, the majority, though it often has a despot's tastes and instincts, still lacks the most improved instruments of tyranny" (1969, 262). He argued that the "sovereign commands of its representative, the central government, have to be carried out by agents who often do not depend upon it and cannot be given directions every minute" (262-263). Furthermore, Tocqueville noted specifically the importance to American governance of the office of the justice of the peace, an institution which the Americans had "borrowed from their English forefathers" (75). Tocqueville argued that the justice "brings with him" to administration "a taste for formalities and for publicity which renders him a most inconvenient instrument for a despotism" (1969, 76).
Notwithstanding the massive growth of the administrative state since the writings of Tocqueville, there are signs that this Anglo-American tradition of administrative independence is still very much with us. Firstly, the British system of local government was to a considerable degree adopted by the American states in establishing the relationships between state governments and local elected officials. As a result, these local officials, including county commissioners, sheriffs, and school board officials, continue even today to exercise significant independence in administering state policies. Secondly, there are numerous examples in our history where public administration has been deliberately insulated from the direct influence of elected officials so that public administrators can act, to a significant degree, independently of the desires of those officials (Cook 1992). Examples here include independent public authorities, regulatory commissions, and the Federal Reserve Board. Thirdly, particularly since the 1960s, the federal government has relied heavily on state and local government agencies to carry out many of its policies through intergovernmental grants and mandates. As a result, the success of these policies is dependent to a considerable degree on the cooperation of autonomous administrative officials. Finally, as John Rohr (1986), James Q. Wilson (1989), and others have observed, the constitutional separation of powers has meant that, even at the federal level of government, administrators are not simply the passive instruments of either the President or Congress. Rather public administrators can and do exercise considerable independence by choosing among their different constitutional masters. A reasonable argument can be made then that these various examples of administrative independence within American governance reflect in significant part the Anglo-American tradition of administrative independence, which the actions of the Stuart justices helped to preserve.

Furthermore, it is also clear that the English tradition of the rule of law, promoted by the justices' practices, has given American public administration a strongly legalistic character. It has encouraged our own practice of seeking to control public administration through both legal and administrative rules and procedures. Indeed, James Q. Wilson has traced our peculiar faith in the power of rules to control bureaucracy to the writings of jurists such as Sir Edward Coke, who sought to limit the power of the Stuart kings by means of the common law. Partly as a result of these influences, according to Wil-
son, we rely "on rules to control the exercise of official judgement to a
greater extent than any other industrialised democracy" (1989, 342).

The image of an independent but legalistic public administration,
which the justices' practices helped promote, therefore, is revealed
quite strongly in our own practice of administration. Historically,
this combination of administrative independence and legalism has
been an important factor in checking abuses of power both on the
part of political leaders and public administrators. Accordingly, pub-
lic administration writers and teachers, as well as would-be adminis-
trative reformers, might do well to pay more attention to the
historical roots of our practice so that they can better understand
and also appreciate their administrative traditions.

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The Prince, His Welfare State, and its Administration

Christiaan Von Wolff's Administrative Philosophy

Mark R. Rutgers

The administrative philosophy of Christiaan Von Wolff (1679-1754) should be of interest to present-day students of public administration. Many of his ideas provided the theoretical foundation for administrative thought throughout the eighteenth century, a period that in many respects is constitutive for administrative thought and practice. Although many know Von Justi and Sonnenfelds as champions of Cameralism, and take an interest in his contemporary and 'student' Frederick the Great from Prussia, Wolff rarely becomes the center of attention in the history of public administration. The core of Wolff's administrative philosophy is that administration is a means to enable happiness in society as a whole and for its individual citizens. Wolff's ideas, although outdated in many respects, probably still underlie many administrative concepts and theories. Last-but-not-least, his writings give us some idea of the complexities involved in constructing a concept of public administration.

This article begins with a general outline of the rise of administrative discourse and its core concepts in the early modern period. It argues that Wolff is a philosophical founding father of public administration. After presenting a short biography, Wolff's administrative philosophy is discussed, starting with his general approach to his subject matter and followed by specific topics in the following paragraphs. In the final section Wolff's legacy, with specific attention to Kant's reaction to Wolff, is presented.
Early Modern Administrative Thought

The origins of the modern administrative state are in the Renaissance. Absolutist state theory and mercantilistic economic dogma in combination with the rise of citizenship, scientific innovations, the discovery of the New World, etc., gave rise to the developments of the modern state. The number of governmental tasks rose, taxes were raised on a more regular basis, standing armies became practice, and bureaucracies started to develop (Raadschelders, 1998; esp. chapter 6). As Osterloh noted (1970, p. 10) wherever economic unity and centralization could be established an administrative apparatus developed. The new developments implied that a different kind of professional was needed for the state service as well (Damkowski, 1969, p. 24). In Germany and Austria-Hungary it was Cameralism that provided the knowledge and training. The first professorships were established in Prussia in 1729, and were soon copied by other universities. Even special 'Cameral-Höhen-Schule' were established. Cameralism fit the developing states and the changing attitude toward humanity—the idea that we could change nature and society and acquire knowledge to use nature and perfect society to the benefit of all (Böning, 1991, p. 92). Science was regarded more and more as an instrument for social progress (Luhmann, 1983).

It was in these early modern times, that law and politics, as well as politics and theology became separated. The early 'public administrationists' were in the forefront of these developments. During a time when political philosophers and lawyers took a more distant position, public administrationists stimulated new intellectual potentials and linked theoretical insights with the practical demands of the new states (cf. Wansink, 1981, p. 34).

The core topic of Cameralism was 'polity'. In the 16th century polity still referred to a very general concept of the 'well order of the common wealth'. In the early 18th century the meaning of polity or 'polizei' (literally 'police') was limited to (what is now called) home administration ('inneren Verwaltung'; Damkowski, 1969, p. 86). Its study encompassed a range of topics—economics, law, physics, industry, 'statistics', and politics.

As a social phenomenon the concept of polity was, however, complex. It was intricately related to a specific theory of state and society—the idea that the state should bring its inhabitants to well-being,
happiness ('Glückseligkeit'), or (using the Aristotelian notion) eudaimonia. The state's polity encompassed all conditions (regulations, functions) needed to achieve this. Von Stein described this conception as the situation where the state had accumulated all power to provide for the material and spiritual well-being of its inhabitants (Von Stein, 1866, p. 12). Welfare state and police state are synonymous in this conceptualization.

Following Von Stein, two periods in the development of Cameralism can be distinguished. First was a period that started with Von Seckendorff's 'Teutscher Fürstenrat' in 1656 (cf. Rutgers, 1997) and ended in the middle of the 18th century. For this period the development of the eudaimonic state was characteristic. It provided the normative foundations for administrative discourse—and thus for the construction of its subject matter ('poizei'). In this early period there was hardly any reflection on the nature of the discourse itself—other than the specific statements of its founding fathers that it was something new. In the second period, authors like Von Justi and Von Spennefels brought Cameralism to its bloom; they were able to really 'break loose' from law and politics, as well as from the monarch's personal interest.

In the early period Christian von Wolff was of prime importance. His theory of the endaimonic state was the basis of the work of mainstream Cameralism. Whereas others were first to construct a specific 'administrative' body of knowledge, Wolff was the philosophical founder of the discourse, giving it a specific focus and the intellectual tools to define its subject matter. As Marchet put it: "Wolff is the philosophical starting point and point of departure ('Ausgangs und Anfangspunkt') of Cameralism. His cameralistic philosophy puts public administration in the forefront of attention" (Marchet, 1966, p. 232).

Biographical Sketch

Christian von Wolff was born on January 24, 1679, in Breslau (now Wroclaw, Poland). He studied philosophy and mathematics in Jena, finishing his studies in Leipzig in 1703. In 1704 he began exchanging ideas with Germany's most prominent intellectual of the time, Leibniz. He became a professor in mathematics and physics at the university of Halle in 1706. Wolff began philosophical lectures in 1709 and almost immediately became very popular. His main book, the
Politics or state-science was published in Latin in 1721. Wolff was attacked by Pietists for atheism and determinism, and on November 8, 1723, he was expelled for these reasons by Friedrich Wilhelm I. Wolff had to leave Prussia within 48 hours 'on the pain of death,' and everyone who used a book of Wolff's was threatened with being sentenced to wheelbarrow labor (Runes, 1963, p. 286).

Wolff's international reputation was greatly enhanced by these measures. Choosing from many offers, he went to Marburg in neighboring Hessen-Kassel. Wolff had close contacts with the monarchy and its high officials. His contacts were not limited to Marburg, but included, for instance, Peter the Great from Russia and his successor Katharina, who provided Wolff with an annual fee (Frauendienst, 1927, p. 41). Wolff became an honorary member of several scientific associations, including the Royal Academy of Sciences in Paris and in London. His fame resulted in many reprints of his Politics (1725, 1732, and 1736). The translation of his work into German (Vernünftige Gedanken vom gesellschaftlichen Leben der Menschen) was the basis of his fame as the founding father of the German philosophic vocabulary and of the German Enlightenment.

In 1733 Friedrich Wilhelm I began attempting to get Wolff back to Prussia. It was, however, his successor Friedrich II (i.e., Frederick the Great) who was able in 1740 to get Wolff to return to Halle (Wolff refused to go to Berlin). To accomplish this, Frederick personally had to ask the King of Sweden to give Wolff leave (Frauendienst, 1927, p. 62). On December 6, 1740, Wolff returned to Halle as 'first professor', Geheim Rat and Vice-Kanzler of the university. In 1745 he was made a member of the nobility, as 'Reichsfreiherr' von Wolff. His contribution to the state sciences was explicitly mentioned in the laudation.

Ironically, his popularity declined. According to some, this was because his ideas had become outmoded, or, as Marchet (1966, p. 323) argued, because his ideas had become so generally accepted that they could no longer evoke enthusiasm, which seems likely considering his many followers over the century.

Wolff died on April 9, 1754, in Halle.
Wolff’s Administrative Philosophy

Possessing a firm belief in the powers of reason, Wolff was a Rationalist. Philosophy, according to him, is the science of everything possible—that is, what is thinkable without contradiction. He was a fervent proponent of systematization of knowledge and regarded mathematics (logic) as the paradigm for all sciences. In this vein he always started from basic principles and deduced ‘truths’ from them. He did not have much patience with empirical data, especially in his Latin work. Nevertheless, his work was as much distant from pure speculation, as it was from unreflective practical experience (cf. Frauendienst, 1927, p. 90).

Science and philosophy, it was his belief, should be practical and primarily aid the laborers (Bönig, 1981, p. 100). In addition to moral and logical treatises, Wolff’s work included a text on growing corn (“Entdeckung der wahren Ursache von der wunderbaren Vermehrung des Getreydes” (1718)). It was considered by Bönig to be a fine example of a mix of speculative and practical writing of the day (Bönig, 1991, p. 98).

Of greatest interest here is Wolff’s role as a state philosopher or ‘Staatsdenker’ (Stolleis, 1977). In an autobiography, Wolff referred to his work as a philosophy for governors (Philosophie der Regenten’), i.e. a handbook for kings and their councilors (cf. Frauendienst, 1927, citation on p.23). In particular Grotius’ and Pufendorf’s Natural law theories influenced Wolff’s ideas on the state. Contrary to his work on logic, the topic of the state proved too much for a strong systematization by means of deduction from such principles as Natural Law. His politics lacked the clear systematization Wolff was known for in other fields (cf. Frauendienst, 1927, p. 85). It was as if he recognized, as many have argued more recently, that social phenomena do not fit a strict mathematical ordering.

Next to Pufendorf, Wolff is the classic representative of the idea of the Law of Nature in relation to the Enlightened State. Both systemized and elaborated upon older theories (Hammerstein, 1977, p. 177). Wolff was influenced by Pufendorf, but did not follow his support of absolutism.

What then is ‘the law of nature’ according to Wolff? Wolff began by describing a (theoretical) state of nature in which individuals are on
their own. Such individuums would by means of rational deliberation ('Vernunft') arrive at the desirability of laws, justice, and duty. The basis of such deliberations is the Law of Nature, which every rational person can discover. Wolff captured this law in its simplest form in the following manner: "Do what makes you and your state more perfect, and refrain from what makes you and your state more imperfect" ("Tue, was dich und deinen Zustand vollkommener machet und unterläß, was dich und deinen Zustand unvollkommener machet") (Wolff 1740, p. 16). All other natural laws can be derived by reasoning from this imperative.

Here we see the rationalistic aspect of his theory, as reason is the teacher of the Law of Nature (Saine, 1987, p. 116). Perfection, or happiness, is attainable by human action in accordance with the Law of Nature and by avoiding negative consequences. Wolff denied the need for a transcendental standard for judging good or evil in human behavior (Flake, 1981, p. 14). It is 'nature' that urges humanity to do good and refrain from evil: "according to Wolff's system the divine law is nothing other than the Law of Nature and can thus in no way contradict it" (Saine, 1987, p. 116/7).

This view is extremely problematic for contemporary (Lutheran) theologians as it opposes the dogmas of corrupted human reason and of original sin. In fact, it can be concluded that, in Wolff's philosophy, ethics and morality were detached from the Christian context. According to him, not only are humans entirely reasonable and able to act morally, irrespective of their beliefs as such, but they can even acquire perfection and, thus, happiness in this world. It must, however, be noted that Wolff referred to earthly happiness ('the good life'), but the implication that human action can be the source of the perfection of the human condition (even in the temporal world) were contrary to theologic dogmas of his day. These ideas were at the heart of the reasons provided for his expulsion from Halle.

The attainment of happiness or perfection is not something a solitary individual can achieve according to Wolff. On the contrary, Wolff regarded humanity as essentially social: we are dependent upon each other. This brings us to his ideas on the nature of social organization.

In his 'politics' Wolff described the nature of state and society. They are not each other's opposites, but constitute a 'union.' He described
the different kinds of social organization: the marital state of husband, wife and children; the paternal society, where education and the mutual care between parent and children is in play; and lordship for the regulation of labor and hiring of servants. Finally, these three come together in the family or large household including husband, wife, children, and servants. This, for Wolff, constituted the basis of society. When families or 'houses' decide to cooperate in order to ensure their mutual perfection, a 'Common Wealth' is created by means of a contract (Wolff, 1744, p. 158).

A common wealth constitutes a state. Wolff stressed that, like all human action, the state is based upon the law of nature, and its actions should be in accordance with natural and international law ("Volkenrecht") (Wolff, 1740, p. 333 & 380). He pointed explicitly at the work of Grotius in this area (Wolff, 1740, p. 391). The transformation of the natural law to the level of the state reads: 'Do what perfects the common wealth and refrain from actions that are in its disadvantage.' In short, the state's purpose is to enable the citizens to live in accordance with the law of nature; therefore it has to ensure justice, safety, and welfare. The basis of the state is that the individual surrenders his freedom. In return, the state cares for the individual: 'Everything is done for the people, but nothing by the people.' The state, that is the eudaimonic or police/polity state, takes care of its citizens. In doing so, it may even infringe on the natural law, but Wolff cautioned that one must be most careful when doing so—he did not regard deviation from the law of nature advisable. He also explicitly criticized administrative actions that did not contribute to the state's purpose. In a similar vein, Wolff could be characterized as professing a mercantilist economic doctrine, whereby autarchy is the aim, but he also explicitly demonstrated that pricing is a social affair, not simply an economic one (Frauendienst, 1927, p. 136).

In his politics Wolff followed Aristotle in the discussion of government: he described monarchy, aristocracy, and polity as the good kinds and tyranny, oligarchy, and democracy as their evil counterparts. Wolff's ideal state ("Frye Republik") was a mixture, with elements of all three, the focus being on the polity, where he thought the balance between personal and societal interest was best guaranteed (Thomann, 1977, p. 258). Even under the enlightened rule of Frederick the Great, these ideas were stretching the limits of what could be expressed publicly. (Thomann suggests that for that reason
Wolff in 1748 replaced the phrase 'Frye Republik' for 'Republica mixta."

In Wolff's view the foundation of the relationship between ruler and ruled is a contract. As stated before, families (a people) first establish a contract for their common wealth or state, which is followed by a contract of subjection, transferring their sovereignty to the ruler. This subjection is rational and in accordance with the law of nature, as the people exchange their sovereignty for well-being and happiness (Frauendienst, 1927, p. 101). This implies not only that the ruler has to be an enlightened person (wise, virtuous, and sincerely loving his people), but also as a matter of enlightened self-interest the ruler actually must put the interest of his people before his own. The relationship between ruler and people is similar to that between father and child—both have obligations, and their happiness is mutually dependent.

The common good (and with it, peace) is the most important objective for a state's administration (Wolff, 1740, p. 407/8). According to Wolff, to achieve this objective two principles should guide administration—justice and benefit ('Nutz', i.e. usefulness or perhaps best expressing Wolff's intentions, the common good). This is not just a theoretical issue, but implies that those involved in administration must know how to act—how to be just and how to improve the common good (Wolff, 1740, p. 418). The questions are, first, whether one is allowed to act and, if so, second, what actions are profitable to the community. In line with the previous section, Wolff rejected a distinction between the benefit of the government and the good of the people (Wolff, 1740, p. 413).

Nonetheless, in Wolff's view the state is allowed to enforce its laws and regulations onto individuals. This is unavoidable in some circumstances. At the same time, Wolff rejected a state that would penetrate too far into the private sphere. He limited the state's authority to affairs involving the common good (Frauendienst, 1927, p. 127). This is a very liberal aspect of Wolff's philosophy. On the other hand, as we shall see, in his view affairs involving the common good include a vast area. To start with, Wolff's Polity State was not only to guard justice and safety, but it was also to be an active welfare state. Wolff distinguished between three areas of state intervention: public health (in a broad sense), care of the poor, and charitable institutions. This resulted in a call for an extensive web of laws and
regulations, intruding into almost every aspect of life. For example, the state was to be concerned with the well-being of children, and Wolff promoted the regulation of Christmas gifts. He also discussed regulating street musicians as well as smell and stench pollution.5

One of the powers Wolff explicitly attributed to the ruler was the appointment of functionaries. Unfortunately, he did not elaborate much on the kinds of functionaries needed, but mainly concerned himself with judges and a few other functionaries. Wolff did, however, discuss more general issues such as the regulation of appointments and salary (advocating a trial period and impartiality, and discussing the kinds of skills needed). He also warned against the accumulation of offices. His views reflected in many respects the Prussian praxis, but to what extent he had this in mind is unclear, for he also put forward many new ideas. For instance, he advocated testing functionaries by means of competitive double appointments during the trial period, and he called for special training of civil servants (before the first Cameralistic chairs were instituted by Friedrich Wilhelm I in 1729).

This brings us to the position Wolff attributed to the sciences in state and society. Wolff had a high regard for the sciences and considered them essential to the purpose of the state. As indicated earlier, in his view, the sciences must be practical in order to be able to contribute to the attainment of a true common wealth. He called for the academies to search for all truth, especially with regard to affairs associated with the polity (Wolff, 1744, p. 241). In his view, science was an important tool for achieving improvement and aiding the happiness of humanity (Ziegenfuss & Jung, 1950, p. 904). Perfection and usefulness coincided in it.

For Wolff, the search for truth demanded a high degree of intellectual freedom. He regarded the acceptance of any belief on the basis of authority absurd—judging for oneself is what intellectual freedom is about. For this reason, Wolff is generally acknowledged as a pioneer for academic freedom: "Sixty years later Kant himself in his essay 'What is Enlightenment?' got no father than Wolff" (Saine, 1987, p. 107; see also: Frauendienst, 1927, p. 168, and Bönning, 1991, p. 99).

Clearly Wolff knew that some ideas could be dangerous to society, and he did not seem vindictive about his own expulsion from Halle.
But he regarded it dangerous to the pursuit of truth and happiness to make a philosopher an outlaw ("vogelfrei"), for he thought that intellectual debate could not be regarded as an evil in itself. As a matter of fact, the important role Wolff attributed to the sciences might be taken as a suggestion, as Frauenendienst claimed (1927, p. 168), that scholars should rule the state. He is in any case explicit with regard to the necessity to educate a king in logical-methodological matters and the sciences in general.

Wolff's Influence

The importance of Wolff is certainly not limited to Cameralism. He is generally regarded as the 'Champion of the German Enlightenment'. His ideas were debated by (currently better known) authors like Herder, Kant, Goethe and Humboldt. In France, his contemporary Voltaire referred to him as the master of German thought (Thomas, 1977, p. 248); "Wolff was the most respected and the most widely known philosopher of the eighteenth century before Kant" (Saine, 1987, p. 103).

Wolff is credited with being the first to distinguish sharply between philosophy and theology, to call for freedom of thought, and to bring a practical orientation to the universities. Because of the translation of his Latin texts into German, he is even regarded as the creator of the German philosophical vocabulary (Frauenendienst, 1927, p. 38; Saine, 1987, p. 103). As shall be explained later, Kant explicitly acknowledged the importance of Wolff for the development of modern thought.

Wolff's approach was particularly strict and systematic. He claimed to be able to provide a comprehensive system of knowledge. This attracted many students and followers (Ziegenfuss & Jung, 1950, p. 906). Although he considered himself an orthodox Lutheran, his work was used extensively by Catholic intellectuals and was taught at their universities in a period when the scars of the Reformation were still very fresh.

His philosophy was strongly influenced by Leibniz, and for a long time his work was considered a systematization and elaboration of Leibniz's philosophy. It became known as 'Leibniz-Wolffian,' but Wolff strongly rejected this term, because it was specifically used by his opponents (Saine, 1987, p. 102). Although Leibniz clearly influ-
enced Wolff (especially his ontology), Wolff was much more eclectic in his sources (in particular using Aquinas, the English moral philosophers, Aristotle, and Descartes). He not only systematized existing knowledge, but also developed his own theories, in particular with regard to the subject matter focused on in this article—his ideas about the state and its administration. In Cameralism Wolff had many followers. His ideas constitute the philosophical underpinning of most 18th century treatises on state administration. Cameralists did not venture specifically into the philosophic controversies Wolff himself dealt with, but took his ideas on the state as their starting point. This was acknowledged in the work of influential nineteenth century authors looking back on their ‘discipline.’ For instance, Marchet (1966, p. 226) placed Wolff in the category of founders/forerunners named ‘Philosophischer Kameralismus’ (Only one other author was very briefly mentioned in this section that was otherwise entirely devoted to Wolff.)

The influence of Wolff on administrative thought was, however, not limited to the discourse reviewed above. Most of his work was translated (by himself) into German, and translations in other languages were soon available to the ‘ordinary’ reader (the ‘politics’ was for instance translated into Dutch in 1744—a country without a Cameralistic tradition). As was mentioned in the biography, Wolff also had many highly positioned contacts and followers in administrative practice—including monarchs, king’s councilors, and the like.

Wolff’s influence on Frederick the Great, his eventual employer, is a matter of some controversy. To start with, Frederick’s father, Friedrich Wilhelm I (who expelled Wolff) is known to have studied Wolff’s writing. In 1739, he devoted three hours a day to Wolff’s texts (Frauendienst, 1927, p. 51). Also, Frederick the Great was educated in Wolff’s ideas. A secret society (the ‘Altephilen’) specifically aimed to instruct the young prince in this philosophy and arranged French translations of Wolff’s work, as Frederick did not read German (Thomann, 1977, p. 262). Friedrich is even known to have directed Voltaire toward Wolff’s work and referred to Wolff’s Logic as ‘the best German handbook available’ (Frauendienst, 1927, p. 60). But Frederick probably never read Wolff’s ‘Politics’, which is the most important work discussed here. According to some, Wolff never influenced Frederick’s administration. On the other hand, a legislative commission instituted by Frederick explicitly built upon Wolff’s ideas on Natural law, and, although Frederick and he never met,
Wolff was appointed ‘Geheim Rat’ (King’s Councilor). Whatever the intricacies of Wolff’s possible influences, Frederick the Great’s actions were consistent with Wolff’s ideas on enlightened government in many respects. It must, however, be noted that Wolff was not an outspoken proponent of absolutism.

Kant on Wolff

Immanuel Kant was undoubtedly one of the most influential philosophers in the late 18th century. He overturned many old ideas, and in particular those of Wolff. But, Kant praised Wolff for his strict method and regarded him as one of the greatest among the rationalistic/dogmatic philosophers who believed that reason could give us absolute truth (Ziegenfuss & Jung, 1950, p. 904). In fact, in his early years Kant used Wolff extensively for his own lectures (Saine, 1987, p. 104). But in his later work, as he developed his transcendental dialectic, he did so in opposition to metaphysical doctrine. Still, it can be argued that Kant did not aim his criticisms so much at Wolff, but at the ‘wolffian’ metaphysics used by Wolff’s followers (École, 1991, p.272).

Of special interest here is Kant’s rejection of Wolff’s core concept—happiness, or eudaimonia. For Wolff it was intrinsic to the Law of Nature that individuals and states aim for happiness. As we have seen, in his view all administrative actions and institutions ultimately derived their legitimacy and goals from their contribution to the attainment of perfection. Kant discussed the concept of eudaimonia when he was looking for the foundations of morality in his treatise ‘Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten’. According to Kant the moral meaning of an action can only be a priori; it is not dependent on contingent circumstances (Kant, 1981, p. 13). He, therefore, disapproved of those ideas of Wolff that were based on empirical starting points—i.e., joining together power, wealth, honor, health and all expressions of happiness under the heading ‘Glückseligkeit’. This, according to Kant, made it impossible to establish when, or to what extent happiness is achieved. At the same time, Wolff’s notion of ‘Glückseligkeit’ implies the apprehension of a ‘totality of happiness’, a maximum independent of time and place. No person, however, can comprehend such a thing according to Kant. What is more, Kant went on to show that in Wolff’s worldview different aspects grouped together under the idea of happiness could be at odds with one another, and/or might not promote happiness (in whatever sense).
Kant concluded that happiness was not a reasonable ideal, but some notion derived from empirical experiences; it could, therefore, not be a guide for action. In short, for him happiness and morality did not coincide. Kant thought that the Eudaimonic State would not bring its inhabitants to virtue ("happiness"), but would on the contrary result in the opposite.

Although Kant did not discuss the consequences of his analysis for public administration in any detail, it is clear that he would not think that happiness could be the intention or goal of the state. Where Kant did refer to administration (for instance in his discussion of sovereignty) he was sympathetic with Montesquieu's ideas on the separation of powers (Damkowski, 1969, p. 132). However, Kant did not break with the notion of polity as an extremely broad range of activities, not limited to the executive. In this respect, he was still very close to the notion of the Eudaimonic State himself, and he defined polity ("Polizei") in terms of public safety, pleasance, and decency ("die öffentliche Sicherheit, Gemächlichkeit und Anständigkeit."). Nevertheless, for Kant, the idea that the state could bring its inhabitants to morality (as central to political thought since classical Greek times) was in conflict with the intended and presupposed freedom of the individual. It was after Kant, in the mid nineteenth century (cf. Rutgers, 1997, p. 288), that the notion of 'polity' was replaced in administrative discourse and acquired a much more restricted meaning.

**Conclusion**

Wolff's vision of the Eudaimonic State provides a normative basis for many students of 'public administration' in Cameralism. He was not an uncritical supporter of absolutism. On the contrary, it can be argued that Wolff in many respects laid the foundations for more liberal ideas that only could surface in the 19th century. However, partly because of Kant, Wolff became a reviled philosopher. It was only after the old notion of polity ("Polizei") was replaced by a modern (and more restricted) meaning that the modern concept of public administration could surface as its successor (cf. Damkowski, 1969, p. 85).

Kant did not annihilate Wolff's legacy entirely, but he helped to obscure its influence. Wolff's legacy can be traced in the important notion of a Rechtstaat, and his ideas prepared the ground for more
critical liberal ideas on the state, its ruler(s), and on human freedom (Thomann, 1977, p. 267-270). Also, through the large numbers of practitioners who studied Wolff, his ideas have lived on in, and shaped the practice of, public administration. What is more, the Wolffian idea that public administration is ultimately a means to realize well-being, is so fundamental to contemporary administrative discourse that it surfaces again and again, whether in terms of social equity, efficiency, integrity, or the like.

It is ironic that an author so fundamental for the development of the administrative discourse in the 18th century has become so completely overlooked in the history of our field (although not in philosophy). This can be attributed in part to the fact that the field of public administration tends to overlook the importance of its underlying normative notions. Wolff’s work shows that the concept of public administration has roots in a more comprehensive philosophy on state and society. Studying these core concepts remains important, not only for administrative theorists but also for practitioners (cf. Wolff, 1740, p. 406). They ultimately provide meaning and legitimacy for our actions.

Notes

1. The notion of the eudaimonic state is at odds with another ‘theory’ that flourished in the early 18th century—Pietism. Pietism taught that well-being is proof of God’s support, and has to be acquired by an ascetical attitude. The Rationalists and Eudaimonist, however, linked well-being with human action (Plake, 1991, p. 13/14).

2. Add to this some other ‘very disturbing’ ideas of Wolff, such as his opinion that atheists are rational human beings and can act just as morally as any Christian, and the opposition that ultimately led to his expulsion from Halle becomes almost understandable.

3. It must be noted that in his ‘politics’ Wolff does not use the term state, but always speaks of a common wealth, or, in the original Latin version, the ‘res publica’ (Frauendorfer, 1827, p. 184). In a footnote of a contemporary translation of another text the remark can be found that the Latin ‘civitas’ is translated as State (adding that ‘state’ seems to have derived from the term ‘standing’) (Wolff, 1740, p. 333).

4. The term ‘polity’ implies, in Wolff’s vocabulary, that nothing is ordained without consent of the people, it becomes ‘democracy’
when justice is simply what the people regard advantageous, whilst neglecting wellbeing and security (Wolff, 1744, p. 171).

5. To Frauenkirst, writing in 1927, this all appeared a horrible intrusion in the private sphere. He sarcastically remarks that Wolff might even consider signs 'do not disturb the birds' (p. 148). Wolff's ideas might, however, not seem so far-fetched for present-day readers at all.

6. "Kurz es ist nicht vermögend, nach irgend einem Grundsätze, mit völliger Gewißheit zu bestimmen, was ihn wahrhaftig glücklich machen werde, darum, weil hierzu Allwissenheit erforderlich sein würde. Man kann also nicht nach bestimmten Principien handeln, um glücklich zu sein, sondern nur nach empirische Ratschlägen, z.B. der Diät, der Sparsamkeit, der Höflichkeit, der Zurückhaltung u.s.w. von welchen die Erfahrung lehrt, daß sie das Wohlbefinden im Durchschnitt am meisten befördern." (Kant, 1981, p. 48).

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Administrative Leadership And Social Change

American Public Administrators and the Environmental Movement

Larry S. Luton

Although the history of public administration has not received the attention it deserves (see for example, Adams, 1992; Stivers, 1996; Luton, 1999b), leadership is a topic that has enjoyed periodic bursts of attention among those who are concerned with issues related to governance, management, and administration. General management literature is replete with new contributions regarding leadership (Hesselbein and Cohen 1999; Hesselbein, et al. 1998; Gardner and Laskin, 1995). Public administration literature has taken a similar turn (Cooper and Wright, 1992; Terry, 1995; Loverd, 1997). Most often these treatments of leadership focus on leadership within an organizational structure, within a corporation or a bureaucracy. But there are also biographies of public administrators that provide more comprehensive views of the impacts of their leadership on society.

This article adds to the literature on administrative leadership by examining examples of the leadership of public administrators in a larger context, in social movements. This is accomplished by reviewing a number of biographies of individuals who are recognized more generally as leaders, but who are often not recognized as public administrators. Obviously, there are limits to the biographical method (Theakston, 1997), but it remains a worthwhile method for the field of public administration. For example, as I have argued before, “analyzing narrative accounts of the experiences of exemplary public administrator should be a very effective way of improving one’s practical understanding of how to better approximate exemplary practice in the administration of public affairs” (Luton, 1999a, p. 39).
Moreover, examining biographies of public administrators with a focus on their roles in social movements will help to improve our understanding of the impact of public administration on society. As Thakston has argued, “leadership in bureaucracies is perhaps best studied and analysed from a historical perspective” (Thakston, 1997, p. 653). It is also true that the relationship between public administration and the larger community is currently undergoing examination and transformation, so this is an important and timely topic for public administrators to consider. Both practitioners and academics in the field need to improve their understanding of the role that public administration institutions play in shaping the substantive policy directions that their nations and communities take. One way of addressing that need is to examine the roles that public administrators have played in relation to specific social changes. This article will address the roles played by public administrators in the environmental movement in the United States.

Public administrators to be focused on in this essay include: John Wesley Powell, Gifford Pinchot, Aldo Leopold, and Rachel Carson. These individuals were selected in part because biographies about them are readily available, but they also represent a good variety of the many styles of leadership. Also, their lives span a period in American history from 1834 to 1964, a period that began with the introduction of science and professional administration into government service and concluded with professional challenges to the ways that science and technological utilitarianism were being used in government. The ways that the relationships among government, science, and professional administration changed in that time period affected the relationship between the environmental movement and public administration, thus altering the roles available to public administrators as leaders in the environmental movement. Powell served as special commissioner for the Bureau of Indian Affairs, as the first director of the U. S. Bureau of Ethnology, and as the second director of the U. S. Geological Survey. Pinchot was the first chief of the U. S. Forest Service and a leading voice in the conservation movement. Leopold did much of his influential work while a professor of game (later wildlife) management at the University of Wisconsin, but he also served in various positions in the Forest Service, and he was an active member of the Izaak Walton League. Carson worked almost 15 years as a biologist, writer and editor for the U. S. Fish and Wildlife Service, but she is most famous for her tremendously influential book, Silent Spring, which played a key role in the
Administrative Leadership And Social Change

U. S. federal government's decision to ban DDT and to more closely control pesticides.

Examining examples such as these, we should be able to gain some insight into the following issues: What roles do governmental institutions play in social change? What role can government service play in establishing individuals as leaders in social movements? How does being employed by the government affect a person's ability to be a leader in a social movement? Is it necessary to step out of public service to become an effective advocate for significant policy change? And, how does the historical context in which public administrators live affect the avenues they are likely to select for furthering causes in which they believe?

Public Administrators and Leadership

It is not at all clear that the American public wants public administrators to be leaders (Price, 1962; Lowi, 1979; Terry, 1995). At best Americans are ambivalent on this issue. Sometimes they are explicitly hostile to the idea of leaders coming from administrative positions. Elected officials often gain public support by declaring their intention to circumcise the influence of the bureaucrats—of 'the staff.' But it would be a mistake to try to prevent administrators from taking leadership roles. Terry has argued that "we need administrative leadership if the United States is effectively to address the challenges of the 21st century" (Terry, 1995, p. xix), but it is also true that we have needed administrative leadership to address the challenges of the past: "Historically, public administration has had a role in every important field of endeavor" (Waldo, 1980, p. 25).

Still, there may be differences in what kinds of administrative leadership we seek. Some people equate leadership with innovation and change within organizations. Examples would include those who would like to see greater entrepreneurship among public administrators (cf., Lewis, 1980; Drucker, 1985; Osborne and Gaebler, 1991; Doig and Hargrove, 1987)). Others conceive of leadership more in terms related to institutional maintenance (Terry, 1995), moral role modeling (Haught (ed.), 1985; Fry, 1989; Van Riper (ed.), 1990; Cooper and Wright, 1992), or heroism (Hubbell, 1990; Bellavita 1991; Terry, 1991; Hubbell, 1991; Stivers, 1993; Ricucci, 1995).
There have been concerted attempts to discern what it takes to be a leader in public administration (Cooper and Wright, 1992; Wheeland, 1994; Ricucci, 1995). But there is not a single formula for leadership (Lassley and Sashkin, 1983b). Leadership is a contingent phenomenon, arising in a context that establishes both the need for it and the general shape that it will take. Leadership in the context of a social movement is, for example, different from leadership inside of a bureaucracy (Eichler, 1983). Leadership is also a personal phenomenon (Denmark, 1983). The specific ways in which a person actualizes leadership derive from her or his particular constellation of capabilities and characteristics. Women tend to have different styles of leadership from men (Denmark, 1983; Stivers, 1993). So, it should come as no surprise that in relation to the environmental movement, the kind of leadership role played by public administrators has varied according to the times as well as according to the individuals involved. Differences among leadership styles and contributions should not be overlooked in an effort to identify leaders.

In the biographical sketches below there will be no attempt to match the administrators with a template of characteristics or behaviors to demonstrate that they are leaders. In this article, it will be assumed that their records of accomplishment support categorizing them as leaders. The purpose of this article is not to analyze the leadership of public administrators, but to provide evidence that public administration, through the actions of specific public administrators, has contributed significantly to the environmental movement. In doing so, the article will contribute to an improved awareness of the role that public administration has played and can play in social change.

**Public Administration and Social Change**

First, however, it may be necessary to explain why such a case needs to be made. It is the author’s experience that public administration’s role in facilitating social change has generally been overlooked. There may be many reasons for this situation, but two that cannot be ignored are: 1) Public administrators have not wanted to highlight their role in politics. Influenced by the politics/administration distinction’s impact on the field, public administrators have not been inclined to assert recognition of their role in the politics involved in social change. 2) The general public image of public administration is that it is a huge, slow-to-move bureaucracy that is biased toward stability and anything but creative. Hampered by their poor image of
bureaucrats, the public has not been inclined to think of them as leaders—and that has been especially so in regard to the political and social arenas related to social change.

The politics/administration distinction has a long tradition in the field of public administration. Wilson contributed to its impact when he argued for a science of administration that grew out of but was different from the science of politics (1887/1987). Goodnow distinguished the governmental functions of politics and administration (1900/1987). And through much of the twentieth century public administrators have taken refuge in the distinction, arguing that they are not involved in the dirty work of politics but are engaged in the business-like administration of public policy and public programs.

It does not take much effort to remind the reader of the public image of the public bureaucracy. Garvey characterized public bureaucracies as having resulted in “institutionalized inefficiency, abuses of discretionary authority, and an inability to adapt” (Garvey, 1993, p. 6). Goodsell has evoked the metaphor of the brontosaurus, a large creature unable to adapt to change and, therefore, now extinct (Goodsell, 1994, p. 8). This poor image of bureaucracies also affects the public image of those who work in them. Bureaucrats are seen as heartless and lazy, as the source of many of our social problems, not as dedicated public servants working to address those problems. Hummel has called them “headless and soulless” (Hummel, 1987, p. 3). As King and Stivers have pointed out, “it is difficult to imagine a hit [television] series based on heroic bureaucrats” (King and Stivers, 1998, p. 5).

The impact of these two tendencies has been to mask the role of public administration in social change behind two myths: public administration institutions are not involved in the politics of social change, and public administrators are not inclined toward facilitating social change. Neither of these myths is accurate.

Modern public administration is the child of social change that became a social movement, the Progressive Era. In that era humans began to believe in their ability to improve continually their living conditions by applying science and technical rationality to their understanding, organization, and manipulation of the world in which they lived. The ground for developing this confidence in the
ability of humans to manage their destiny was prepared by those who in the latter half of the nineteenth century promoted science and established institutions to further its contribution to improving the welfare of humankind. The early stage of the conservation movement was a key component of the Progressive Era (Hays, 1959). According to Waldo, "The idea of saving natural resources soon developed into a social philosophy—saving human beings; and ultimately into the idea of a 'planned' and 'administered' human community" (Waldo, 1984, p.9).

American Public Administrators in the Environmental Movement

When American environmentalism was born, it appeared as a movement united against the selfish and wasteful exploitation of the nation's natural resources by greedy individuals and corporations. However, it did not take long for the movement to diversify into streams of thought and policy preferences that did not always agree with each other—and sometimes could hardly abide each other. From the initial split between conservationists and preservationists (see Nash, 1973, especially chapter 10), the environmental movement has over the years developed into a wide variety of groups with many conflicting positions (Shabecoff, 1993; Kline, 1997). It may be true that all of the streams continue to oppose wasteful exploitation, but they differ in what they recognize as wasteful—and sometimes in their tolerance for exploitation at all.

From the start, public administrators have been heavily involved in the environmental movement. The vast majority of entries in Clapp's Leaders of American Conservation (1971) describe people who spent significant portions of their professional lives in public administration. For example, George Perkins Marsh (1801-1882), who held public office most of his life, is often credited with originating a perspective that developed into the modern concept of ecology. His book Man and Nature still appears on short lists of must reading for environmentalists. Ansel Adams, one of the most acclaimed environmental photographers, spent time as a photomuralist for the Department of Interior. The founder of the Wilderness Society, Bob Marshall, worked for the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Forest Service. Olaus Murie, author of a definitive work on elk, did much of his research as an employee of the Department of Agriculture's Biologi-
Administrative Leadership And Social Change

cal Survey. Even Edward Abbey, author of the anarchistic novel *Monkey Wrench Gang* was a park ranger in Utah (Bishop, 1994, p. xiii).

As the American environmental movement has evolved over the last 150 years, though the ideas of public administrators are referenced in many of the streams, the institutions of public administration overwhelmingly served the more centrally positioned of the streams. In the natural resource area, public administration institutions have tended to serve utilitarian conservation. Enforcement of the Endangered Species Act by governmental institutions is a significant exception to that generalization, but its implementation is continually limited by utilitarian concerns (e.g., trying to find ways that Pacific salmon runs can be saved from extinction without breaching dams that contribute to irrigation and power generation). In the environmental pollution area, public administration has tended to pursue utilitarian goals (e.g., reducing the adverse health impacts of air pollution) in ways that are limited by pragmatic compromises (e.g., Best Available Control Technology or pollution credit trading).

Public administration has always been a part of the environmental movement, but as the movement has diversified it has developed many perspectives that are alien to public administration. As the following sketches will illustrate, public administrators have made significant and positive contributions throughout the history of the environmental movement, and their roles have reflected historical changes both within the environmental movement and in the relationship between public administration and that movement.

**John Wesley Powell (1834-1902)**

John Wesley Powell's importance to the environmental movement derived from three aspects of his work: 1) his contributions in the organization of science in government, 2) his contributions to environmental sciences, and 3) his policy recommendations regarding land management in *Report on the Lands of the Arid Region of the United States* (Stegner, 1954; Luton, 1999a).

Much of his work in organizing the use of science in government was a function of public administration positions that he held. He directed federal geographic and geologic surveys of public lands in the American West, and one year after those surveys were consoli-
dated under the U. S. Geological Survey, he was appointed its director. Within six years he had tripled its budget (Stegner, 1954, p. 273). He also was the first director of the Bureau of Ethnology (Clepper, 1971, p. 265). At a time when corporations and wealthy individuals were quite dominant influences in exploration of the West, Powell argued that science should not be applied only for the wealthy, but government also should support it because “knowledge is for the welfare of all the people” (Stegner, 1954, p. 292).

His contributions to environmental sciences ranged from his explorations of the American West and the reports and maps that derived from them to his insights on the behavior of streams. It was Powell who first envisioned compiling topographic maps of the entire United States. According to Stegner, Powell’s classification of streams as antecedent, consequent, and superimposed has become the “alphabet of the study of drainage” (Stegner, 1954, p. 153).

Powell’s most important policy recommendations may have come in his Report on the Lands, which advised against use in the West of the standard land survey approach used in the eastern United States—the checkerboard grid. He thought that management of land needed to take into account the environmental conditions of the area. Because the lack of water in the West needed to be the dominant factor in dividing land for agricultural purposes, Powell promoted an approach that would not have 160 acres as its standard. Eighty acres was a sufficient amount of irrigable land for a homestead, but 2,660 acres might be needed for pasturage. The National Academy of Sciences supported his recommendations, but Congress did not accept them, and the controversy eventually led to his ouster as director of the Geological Survey. Some of his recommendations were incorporated years later in the 1902 Reclamation Act, but the value of Powell’s influence on federal land policy remains in dispute. Still the Bureau of Reclamation has called him “the father of irrigation development,” (Warne, 1973, p. 4) and at least a couple of secretaries of the Interior Department (Stewart Udall and Bruce Babbitt) have claimed to be inspired by him (Hepworth, 1996, p. 19). Of the import of Powell’s Report on the Lands, historian Bernard De Voto said, “In the whole range of American experience from Jamestown on there is no book more prophetic” (quoted in Udall, 1963, p. 96).

Although Powell’s ideas and his confidence in science were important counters to mythical and romantic notions of the relationship
between human activities and the land, his was not a very advanced environmental perspective. He thought that humans could use science to avoid being as subject to the forces of nature as other species. But he did recognize that nature placed limits upon human achievements, and he tried to move public lands policy in a direction that recognized some of those limits.

**Gifford Pinchot (1865-1946)**

Gifford Pinchot was instrumental in bringing a science-based approach to forest management to the United States. He was the first native-born U. S. citizen to obtain formal education in forestry (going to France to obtain it), and was a member of the National Academy of Sciences Forest Commission that first recommended a forest reserve system and instigated the Forest Reserve Act of 1897. He was placed in charge of George W. Vanderbilt's Biltmore estate forest in North Carolina in 1892 and used that position to engage in the first systematic forest management endeavor in the U. S. In 1897 he was appointed "special forest agent" for the Department of the Interior, and in 1898 he was named head of Interior's Division of Forestry (Strong, 1971, p. 72). That division evolved into the Forest Service and was transferred into the Department of Agriculture in 1905. He also founded the Yale School of Forestry and the Society of American Foresters (Clepper, 1971, pp.259-260).

He has been described as a "master administrator" and a "magnificent bureaucrat" and has been given credit for "creating a team spirit in his agency that has rarely been matched in any government agency" (Strong, 1971, p. 72; Udall, 1963, pp. 103-104). Much to the chagrin of some members of Congress, he removed the Forest Service from the patronage system and placed it under the civil service system in 1904. In his administration, he created a model of progressive public administration reform, leading his critics to complain that forest system officials were "too efficient" (Strong, 1971, p. 79). After years of using governmental authority over land as a means of gaining political allies, not everyone saw a science-based approach to land management as beneficial.

One impact of Pinchot's leadership was an increase in the role that government played in managing natural resources. "Pinchot favored public control of the nation's resources because he believed that this control would insure the rational, scientific use of the land" (Strong,
1971, p. 78). During his tenure the national forests grew from 51 million acres to 175 million (Clepper, 1971, p. 259)—16 million acres added in one long work day by Pinchot and President Theodore Roosevelt to frustrate the aims of a Congressional move to require legislative approval of future national forests. He also was a key player in establishing governmental institutions, instigating the creation of both the forest service and the reclamation service. He convinced President Roosevelt to appoint an Inland Waterways Commission (1907) to prepare a “comprehensive plan for the improvement and control of the river systems of the United States” and a National Conservation Commission (1908) to inventory the nation’s natural resources (Strong, 1971, pp. 81 and 88). But Pinchot did not support every role that government might play in managing the nation’s resources. Favoring commodity uses of natural resources, he opposed proposals for national parks (Strong, 1971, p. 78; Udall, 1963, p. 108).

When Roosevelt’s successor, Taft, proved not to be as supportive for his agenda, Pinchot began working outside of government channels. He organized the National Conservation Association to promote his ideas. Eventually the conflict between him and Taft led to Pinchot’s resignation, but that was not the end of his public service. He was a serious contender for Republican presidential candidacy in 1924, and he served in Pennsylvania as secretary of the Department of Forestry and as governor (1923-27 and 1931-35).

In addition to the institutions he helped build, Pinchot left an intellectual legacy. He wrote extensively; his books include The Fight for Conservation and Breaking New Ground. It may be that Pinchot should be credited with bringing the term ‘conservation’ into common use in the United States (Pinchot, 1947; p. 322-326; Hays, 1959, pp. 5-6; Clepper, 1971, p. 260; Strong, 1971, p. 81; Udall, 1963, p. 106). It is clear that his definition of conservation has made a lasting impression. To him conservation meant “the use of earth for the good of man” (Udall, 1963, p. 106).

His version of conservation reflected his utilitarian attitude toward natural resources, and was part of the intellectual divide in the dispute over Hetch Hetchy, where the split among environmentalists between conservationists and preservationalists was embodied in the Pinchot versus Muir positions (Nash, 1973, pp. 161-181; Kline, 1997, pp. 61-62). Pinchot favored development of a reservoir to supply San
Francisco and Muir favored preservation of the river valley. In his testimony before the House Committee on the Public Lands, Pinchot proclaimed: "the fundamental principle of the whole conservation policy is that of use, to take every part of the land and its resources and put it to the use in which it will serve the most people" (quoted in Nash, 1973, p. 171). So, as Udall has concluded, if Pinchot was not the fountainhead of the conservation movement, "he was nevertheless one of its vital sources. He was key man of a key decade, and his leadership was crucial in persuading the American people to turn from flagrant waste of resources to programs of wise stewardship" (Udall, 1963, p. 107).

Aldo Leopold (1887-1948)

Aldo Leopold's life was a microcosm of the evolution of environmental thought from anthropocentric utilitarian conservation to biocentric ecological consciousness. Both Leopold (1966, p. 138) and Flader (1974, p. 1) trace his development of an ecological consciousness to an experience he had early in his time with the U. S. Forest Service—watching a wolf die. My reading of his biographies leads to the conclusion that the evolution of his thought was much more gradual than that oft-repeated story implies (Luton, 1997), but for the environmental movement the importance of his transformation (and of his ability to explain it) can hardly be overestimated.

At the beginning of his professional life, Leopold was a follower of Pinchot's version of environmentalism, but his vision eventually transcended that of his leader. As his understanding of ecological relationships improved, he changed his positions regarding proper management techniques. From a promoter of 'varmint' elimination he evolved into a believer in the need to balance predator and prey populations. From a promoter of large deer populations, he spent his last years fighting for controlled populations. Committed initially to timber production, he would later refer to the Forest Service's emphasis on timber production as "wood factory economics" (Flader, 1974, p. 141). An early supporter of wilderness for recreational purposes, he later leaned toward ethical justification for wilderness (Flader 1974, p. 29).

Leopold's significance as a role model for public administrators is a complex matter. His example belies the common image of bureaucrats as lacking in imagination and creativity, but it does so with
both positive and negative implications for overcoming the stereotype. Leopold’s legacy for public administration includes a quite imaginative and creative vision of the relationship between humans and their environment, but as Flader (1974, p. x) has noted, Leopold was often dismissed and disparaged by his professional contemporaries as an impractical idealist. It is this contrast in the impact of Leopold on his contemporaries and on the environmental movement that complicates our understanding of Aldo Leopold’s leadership.

Leopold graduated from the Forestry School at Yale that Gifford Pinchot founded. His first job after graduating was in Pinchot’s Forest Service. Although his administrative career did not begin well, an investigation of his performance led to a recommendation that he be given a second chance—and that time he did much better. Two years after leaving Yale, he was promoted to deputy supervisor, then supervisor of the Carson National Forest. Health problems ended that assignment and eventually led to recognition that he would no longer be able to keep up with the fieldwork needed from a forest supervisor, so he began to focus his attention on writing about wildlife conservation.

The impact of his ideas and writing on Forest Service policies was significant. He wrote the first handbook on fish and game, lead in promoting the location of private recreational facilities on forest service lands, proposed the service’s first game refuge, and helped establish the first officially designated wilderness area.

But frustration with his assignment to the Forest Products Lab and the economic challenges of the 1930s combined to create a period of transition for Leopold—from public administrator, to privately employed consultant, to university professor.

In his life as a university professor, his ideas began to run so far ahead of the field that “most of his recommendations...received scant attention” (Flader, 1974, p. 131). But he found many ways to promote his ideas, from sitting on the President’s Committee on Wildlife Restoration and the Wisconsin Conservation Commission to working through the Wilderness Society. And his ideas eventually took root. In the year that Leopold died, the Wisconsin Conservation Commission finally recommended the policy on deer population control that Leopold had unsuccessfully promoted for five years. His continuing legacy is evident in the Clinton administration’s support
of ecosystem management, an approach that owes much to Leopold's concept of the 'land ethic': "[an] ethic dealing with man's relationship to land and to the animals and plants which grow upon it" (Leopold, 1966, p. 238).

Meine concluded in his biography of Leopold that he was "a man whose deeds were at least as noteworthy as his words," (Meine, 1988, p. xi), but it is probably true that "it is the land ethic—his conception of land health, or the philosophy of a natural self-regulating system, coupled with his assertion of individual obligation—that represents Aldo Leopold's most enduring contribution" (Flader, 1974, p. 270). The fact that both the Forest Service and Earthfirst! claim to have been inspired by him points to the breadth of his impact on the environmental movement.

Rachel Carson (1907-1964)

Rachel Carson's greatest contribution to the environmental movement derived from her writing, especially her book *Silent Spring*. Referring to the environmental movement as a powder keg ready to explode, Philip Shabecoff said that her book "lit the fuse" (Shabecoff, 1993, p. 110). On a similar note, Paehlke said, "If its origins could be linked to any one event, environmentalism might be said to have begun in 1960 with the publication of Rachel Carson's profoundly important book, *Silent Spring*" (Paehlke, 1989, p. 21). In a slightly more tempered assessment, Kline said of the book: "it heralded the beginning of the *modern* environmental movement" (Kline, 1997, p. 78) [my emphasis].

Most people do not even realize that Carson was a public administrator. Because careers in science were difficult for women to establish in the second quarter of the twentieth century, Carson was urged by her mentor Mary Scott Skinker to look into the federal civil service (Lear, 1997, p. 78). She began her employment with the federal government in 1935 as a part-time writer for the educational division of the U. S. Bureau of Fisheries (Lear, 1997, p. 80). In August 1936 she became a full-time junior aquatic biologist—"one of only two women then employed in the bureau at a professional level" (Lear, 1997, p. 82). In this position her main activities remained analyzing data, writing reports, and producing brochures. In 1939 she was recommended for promotion to assistant aquatic biologist and given wider duties. However, also that year the bureau was reorga-
nized into the U. S. Fish and Wildlife Service. That reorganization delayed her promotion until 1942. In addition to her analysis and writing, she became more involved in planning publication projects and was made editor of *Progressive Fish-Culturist*. In 1943 she was promoted again, and as Lear described the situation:

At thirty-six, Carson was now a seasoned government bureaucrat, an associate biologist rising steadily through the government grades. As her government salary increased, her editorial responsibilities expanded, leaving less and less time for personal traveling or writing (Lear, 1997, p. 109).

Despite her tendencies toward perfectionism, Carson was considered by her superiors and staff to be a good manager, and her rise through the ranks of Fish and Wildlife (eventually to chief editor) entailed greater responsibilities in policy, planning, and supervision. She also became involved in writing speeches for Interior Department staff. Her work in planning and developing a series of pamphlets known as *Conservation in Action* was probably her greatest satisfaction in government service, but it was not sufficient to divert her from her real goal of being an independent author. Though her career in public service was a successful one, the tension between her desire to be an independent writer and her need for financial security was a constant drain on her energy and attention. She found it difficult to write much in her spare time, but by 1945 she knew that she would have to publish more if she wanted to leave government employment.

It was the success of *The Sea Around Us* that set the momentum toward Carson's departure from public service. It was serialized in *The New Yorker*. The Book of the Month Club made it an alternate selection. It was the front-page feature review in the *New York Times Book Review*. It was on the best-seller list for 36 weeks, 32 of them as number 1. It won the National Book Award for nonfiction, the Burroughs Medal, and was voted by the *New York Times* as the outstanding book of 1951. As a consequence, Carson's status, of course, rose tremendously. She was inundated with requests to speak, and was given numerous awards—including being elected a fellow of the Royal Society of Literature in England, an honorary membership in Theta Sigma Phi (women in journalism), the Geographical Society’s Henry Grier Bryant Gold Medal, the New York Zoological Society’s Gold Medal, the Department of Interior’s Distin-
guished Service Award, and honorary doctorates at Drexel, the Pennsylvania College for Women, Oberlin College, and Smith College. Her book’s success also produced a royalty income that provided her with financial independence and security. Her resignation from 16 years at Fish and Wildlife became effective on June 3, 1952.

Carson’s years of public service not only provided her financial sustenance while she developed her ideas and her writing, but they also contributed to her understanding of the environment and to the impact of her ideas. “Carson’s work at the bureau, far from limiting her, continued to deepen and expand what was already part of her singular approach to nature” (Lear, 1997, p. 93). The years that she spent writing and managing Fish and Wildlife projects created for her a network of environmental scientists from whom she gathered expertise and with whom she shared her ideas and insights (Lear, 1997, p. 333), among them wildlife biologists who were concerned about predator and pest control (Lear, 1997, p. 118). It gave access to records and reports and provided her opportunities to travel and spend time along the seacoast and out on the water. When she decided to work on a book about the impact of pesticides, the networks she had developed at Fish and Wildlife and in her work for environmental groups like the Nature Conservancy, Audubon Society, and Wilderness Society helped provide her access to the information she needed. They also provided her expert feedback as she prepared her chapters (Lear, 1997, p. 401). And when corporate scientists attacked her credibility in attempts to undermine her argument in Silent Spring, her career in public service and her relations with a wide network of other scientists were important elements in defending her views and promoting the cause for which she advocated. Not insignificant in the ultimate impact of her argument was that “Carson’s years of experience in government kept her pragmatic and made it that much more impossible for legislators to dismiss her” (Lear, 1997, p. 453).

Carson’s leadership in the environmental movement was not a direct function of her work as a public administrator. But her time in public service provided her a professional career in a time of limited opportunity for women. It kept her in touch with areas of science that she sought to pursue in her career. And it provided her with a background that was crucial to the impact she had. Moreover, her leadership and the impact of her campaign against pesticides provide evidence of the connections between the environmental move-
ment and public administration. Even when the impetus for change comes from outside of government institutions, it is often those institutions that must act for the change to be implemented.

Conclusions

Public administrators have played a significant role in the life of the environmental movement. But it must be admitted that this may not be true generally of the relationship between public administrators and social movements. There may be something inherent in the substance of the environmental movement that requires a close connection between public administrators and pursuit of environmental goals. It may be that without governmental institutions, society would have no hope of achieving environmental goals. And that may not be the case for all social movements.

But it is clear that public administration institutions have over the years facilitated the impact of the environmental movement. Both conservation and preservation of natural resources have undeniably been facilitated by the work of public administrators. For example, endangered species would have no effective protection were it not for government policy and its implementation. Those who find the impact of the environmental movement too circumscribed probably blame public administration institutions for hampering more radical changes, but even some of the more radical voices in the environmental movement have spent time in public administration. The examples of Powell and Pinchot demonstrate that public administrators played key leadership roles in the early stages of the environmental movement. As that movement evolved, it began to promote ideas, policies, and actions that were beyond the ability of democratic institutions to deliver. Leopold worked within the system to promote reasonably attainable goals. Although his vision far exceeded the reach of the institutions of his time, it inspired later generations of public administrators.

Sometimes, however, it may be necessary for those not constrained by their governmental role to lead the way to public policy improvements. When that is the case, government service can still contribute to the impact of a leader’s activities. The example of Rachel Carson demonstrates that public service employment can contribute to the insights and credibility of environmental advocates in their work outside of government. Today it may be necessary to step outside of
the institutions of public administration to promote some of the environmental movement's agenda. A biocentric approach to natural resource administration seems to be beyond the ken of many elected officials. But it is probable that biocentric ideas will not obtain much impact on natural resource management until they reach into the policies and actions of public bureaucracies. In the receptivity to Leopold's ideas that can now be found within the Departments of Interior and Agriculture, an optimist might find hope. These things take time, and may require new leaders.

Each of the administrators profiled in this article contributed in a way that shaped the opportunity for leadership found by those who came later. As has been shown, John Wesley Powell contributed to the promotion of science in government. He also participated in increasing our environmental knowledge and in establishing public administration institutions that worked to ensure that the public benefited from those increases. Without that kind of foundation, Gifford Pinchot's conservation programs could not have been established. And without Pinchot's work, Aldo Leopold's evolution from an expert in game management to an advocate for wildlife management would not likely have taken place. Without the sensitivity to our relationship with other species implied in Leopold's 'land ethic,' Rachel Carson's warning about pesticides might not have had its monumental impact.

The American public may not be sure that it wants public administrators to help lead the way in social change, but history shows that public administrators have played key roles in the evolution of environmental policy and the life of the environmental movement. If they were aware of those contributions, the American public would probably applaud them. Moreover, considering the centrality of governmental institutions in adopting and implementing public policy, it should not come as a surprise that public administrators continue to be involved. They should not wait for the applause prior to beginning the next act.

References


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Public Administration in the Social Reform Movement

M. Curtis Hoffman

A student of American public administration finds references in the literature indicating that “public administration came of age as a discipline during the progressive era” (Spicer, 1995, p. 26), that “significant progress was made during this era in constructing a civil service that met the needs of modern industrial society” (Stever, 1988, p. 104), that public administration was “a product of turn-of-the-century urban reformers and the emerging omnipresence of the bureaucratic state” (Perry & Keller, 1991, p. 4), and so on. Moreover, the progressive era is frequently portrayed as a primary source of public administration’s misdirection. Authors often leap back to the Republic’s founding period to seek inspiration for theoretical redirection.

For local public administration, the legacy of the progressive era has generally been the structuralist reformers’ desire for government efficiency. Undeniably, the ideas of structural reform were important and eventually dominant. However, recent historical scholarship on the progressive era has focused on other facets of public philosophy, including nurturing a sense of national community (Eisenach, 1994) and cultivating a democratic public (Mattson, 1998). These studies make suspect reliance on the structural reform tradition as the sole source of progressive-era public administration theory.

In comparison to structural reformers, the so-called social reformers, whose public philosophy encompassed strong communitarian elements, mechanisms of direct democracy and a deep suspicion of business interests, have been relatively ignored as a source of public
administration theory and practice. Yet the original rationale for many of modern public administration's intrinsic features, including nonpartisanship in appointments, public ownership of utilities, administrative oversight by a strong executive, specialized educational programs in administration, and the belief that government can and should ameliorate the hardships suffered by the citizenry, can be traced to the ideas and actions of both social and structural reformers. The neglect of social reform may have originated because post-progressive scholars considered social reform ideas discordant with their representation of a professional and technocratic public administration. Thus they tended to diminish or ignore social reform contributions to the discipline.

Offered here, in order to broaden our understanding of the progressive era and its impact on public administration, is an exploration of several alternative traditions that constituted social reform, namely Georgism, the Social Gospel, and municipal republicanism. Although great differences divided these social reform philosophies, adherents all shared an interest in the nature of urban community and a concern for preserving democratic governance. Their vision was much broader than instituting a businesslike public administration. They sought to expand the scope of local government and increase the expertise of local public administrators with the intention of fostering a broad rejuvenation of the American polity.

This exploration is possible because of the number and quality of texts left by six social reformers directly involved in developing local public administration in Cleveland from 1901 to 1915.1 The leader of these social reformers was Tom L. Johnson. Prior to becoming mayor, Johnson was a wealthy industrialist, a US Congressman and a protégé of American political-economist Henry George. Johnson's lieutenant, Peter Witt was a political activist with ties to the populist and labor movements. He served as director of the quasi-governmental Tax School, clerk of council, and traction commissioner. Dr. Edward Bemis, waterworks superintendent, had a Ph.D. from Johns Hopkins University and maintained close ties to Richard Ely, John R. Commons and the Social Gospel movement. Reverend Harris Cooley was a Disciples of Christ minister who served as Director of Charities and Corrections and oversaw the construction of rural colonies for Cleveland's prisoners, juvenile delinquents, orphans, homeless, elderly and sick. Attorney Frederic Howe, an accomplished author on reform issues, served as city councilman, state senator
and tax commissioner. Attorney Newton D. Baker, a gifted orator, served as city solicitor and mayor before becoming Woodrow Wilson’s Secretary of War. Earlier, Baker and Howe both attended some of America’s inceptive public administration courses taught by Ely, Wilson and Albert Shaw at Johns Hopkins University.

Cleveland is of special interest in the study of social reform because it was one of the few cities where social reformers were politically dominant. Even the structuralist reformers were forced into opposition. Thus, the Cleveland of 1901-1915 represents a unique opportunity to study the theory and practice of public administration within a philosophical environment that owed little to the familiar ideas of structural reform.

What follows is organized into two parts. The first presents the image and substance of public administration which was rejected by the social reformers. The second presents the public administration which they aspired to create.

What public administration was not to be

The mayoralties of Johnson (1901-1909) and Baker (1912-1915) were characterized by perpetual experimentation with municipal government function, unprecedented growth in municipal government size, and the frequent alteration of municipal government forms. New departments, divisions or agencies were created for traction commissioner, civil service commission, ash collection, tuberculosis sanitarium, building inspection, playground, street signs and grade crossings. Rural farm colonies were built to house and employ the convicted criminals, the long-term ill, the poor, the elderly, the juvenile delinquents and the orphaned. Municipal ownership was established in four public baths, two beach baths, two dance halls, three grocery markets and an electric generation plant. Municipal employees replaced contractors in the departments of street cleaning, sewer and water, lighting, garbage and night soil. The safety forces increased from 376 to 789 police officers and from 411 to 622 firefighters. The extent of paved roads expanded from 184.7 to 560.4 miles. The city debt ballooned from 13.3 to 54 million dollars. The city’s government structure changed from strong mayor to a decentralized board plan and the back to a strong mayor.
The Johnson coterie's expansion of Cleveland's municipal administrative capacity was not primarily intended to promote "efficiency," at least as an end in itself. Rather, the potential and actual inefficiencies of government administration were well recognized. They would argue that government could be made efficient in theory. They endeavored to improve efficiency in practice. But they promoted government efficiency always with larger plans in their minds, including prison colony farms, city-owned electric plants, public markets, and radical tax restructuring. They saw improving the reputation of government as a precondition for popular acceptance for these more ambitious plans. In Howe's words:

We are building our democracy on men and are developing our cities on a human rather than a property basis. This has been a temporary burden. It has probably delayed efficiency. But it involves self-government and a sense of responsibility on the part of voters. And the achievement of this in itself is even more to be desired than efficiency. (Howe 1915, pp. 58-59)

While the social reformers and structural reformers shared many objectives, including improving budgetary procedures, dismantling the spoils system, centralized municipal administration, ending petty corruption, and providing better city services, the social reformers had different theories of governance and different objectives for public administration. First, they did not see an expert public administration as a source for public decision-making autonomous from elected officials. Second, they did not see an intellectually cloistered public administration whose orientation was apolitical and professional. Third, they did not see public administration as an ideologically neutral tool for efficient government.

Not an autonomous decision-making agent. American local public administration has acquired a certain autonomy from the electoral processes. A large number of local government employees are covered by civil service rules that secure their tenure even as the local elected offices are turned over. Municipal employees are not necessarily expected to share the ideologies nor embrace the policy objectives of their elected superiors. In addition, a large part of local public administration is not only protected by civil rules, but attached to regional commissions and boards whose membership is appointed for fixed terms. Thus these public servants are even more insulated from the electoral process, and more buffered from public
scrutiny, than their municipal counterparts. This autonomy can be defended as a means of securing high quality personnel. It can also be appreciated as a mechanism to check the power of over ambitious elected officials (Spicer, 1995, p. 67).

The Johnson coterie saw public administrators as instrumental in carrying out policy and as expert advisors to elected officials, not as autonomous decision-making agents. They believed that municipal employees should be strictly subordinate to the department manager, and the department manager should be strictly subordinate to the elected mayor. When a mayor stood for reelection, the citizenry were asked to evaluate the conduct of the entire administration and vote accordingly. From the viewpoint of the Johnson coterie, an autonomous public administration partly disenfranchised the voters, whose faith in the ballot box was considered paramount for developing their civic sense.

With the power of Ohio mayors potentially checked by the legislature, courts, independent boards, and elected cabinet members, the Johnson coterie did not intuit a need for another check. Rather, they believed that the constitutional logic of checks and balances was intended and appropriate only for the federal government. Furthermore, they perceived that the circumstances of urbanization were new, and local government needed to hear and respond to the new urban communities that it now governed. This demanded clear lines of administrative authority and accountability if service delivery were to be expanded, and if the ballot box were to be used to validate an administration’s service delivery record.

The Johnson coterie also opposed autonomous boards, commissions and special districts that reduced the scope of municipal authority. Rather than incubating expertise and efficiency, they saw these entities as removing the workings of government from the scrutiny and control of the voters. They believed specialized government bodies increased the public’s disaffection with politics and facilitated manipulation of government by wealth.

Johnson and Howe both expressed suspicion of civil service rules that prevented municipal employees from being fired by their superiors. Johnson’s civil service process was hierarchical, with no appeal going above the mayor. This was because the mayor was supposed to be accountable to the voters for the conduct of municipal employees.
The civil service reforms instituted under Baker in 1913 were more structuralist in character. However, the mayor not only appointed the civil service commissioners to their six-year terms, but could dismiss them for "inefficiency, neglect of duty or malfeasance in office" without a hearing or review by council. Furthermore, the only new barrier to political activity placed on classified personnel was that they could not solicit political contributions.

Not a professionally cloistered public administration. The public administration inherited from structural reformers aspires to be a profession. Public administration scholars endeavor to give the field an identity, a knowledge base, and a legitimacy separate from politics and political science. Public administrators are credentialed and organized to distinguish them from their counterparts in business. The benefits of professionalization are argued to include increased technical expertise and rational decision making, respect for high standards and ethical behavior, and encouragement of information sharing and practical research (Mertins, 1977; Riggs, 1982). This allows public administrators to acquire direction and validation from within the profession itself, even if they are alienated from the democratic process and cynical about direction from elected officials.

Rather than administrators who held credentials attesting to expertise in arcane knowledge, the Johnson coterie valued those who could perform as civic educators. While many college-trained administrators were employed, they were not expected to recognize a strong line between a political and an administrative function. Unlike the structural reformers, no attempt was made to remove public administration personnel entirely from the political arena. The expectation for Johnson's municipal experts was that they both apply their knowledge (an administrative activity) and educate the public in their area of expertise (a political activity).

For Johnson, public administrators were first and foremost citizens. Johnson believed that political activity was one of the most important acts of a citizen. Administrators speaking at political assemblies were educating the public. Johnson believed that honest, competent civil servants, whose career was serving the public, had an intrinsic interest in educating the public.

Bemis, the only expert Johnson brought from outside of Cleveland, saw expertise itself as a political issue. Those persons trained as
administrators and engineers understood and appreciated expertise. Thus they had a duty to educate the public about the benefits of expertise in government. To Bemis, removing the greatest proponents of expertise from the political process seemed counter-productive.

Not an apolitical, ideologically neutral tool for efficient government. The image of the public administrator inherited from structural reformers is one of a professional and competent official with no particular ideological predisposition. The ideal public administrator is expected to apply expertise to executive and legislative initiatives without the influence of ideology or politics.

The Johnson coterie believed that experts should serve in government, but only those experts that supported a mayor's policies should serve that mayor's administration. Experts were as ideological as politicians. Johnson and Baker would appoint non-Democrats if the appointees agreed with the fundamental goals of the administration. But they did not believe that the public servants who served them should be the same ones who could serve in a “stand pat” (conservative) or “businesslike” (structural reform) administration. Although they knew a mayor could potentially fire competent administrators and appoint friends, benefactors and lackeys in their stead, they believed a sufficiently aroused and informed citizenry would simply vote such a mayor out of office. They put their trust in the voters more than in civil service rules. They believed a democratic public, once properly educated and engaged, would guarantee expertise rather than obstruct it.

Instead of bureaucratic neutrality, the Johnson coterie sought to create a public administration that was ideologically committed to opposing “privilege,” their term for the use of public power to create private wealth. They believed that the wealthy would always be tempted to usurp the power of government for their own ends. Public administrators had to be ideologically predisposed to spurning these attempts. Johnson felt that all city employees “from the mayor down to the man who cleans the street” should be willing to work toward “an ideal government” free from the influence of privilege (quoted in Briggs, 1962, p. 65). Johnson elaborated:

In selecting my cabinet and in making other appointments I looked about for men who were efficient and when I found one

Public Administration in the Social Reform Movement
in whom efficiency and a belief in the fundamental principles of democracy were combined I knew that here was the highest type of public officer possible to get... Though our work had been hampered by injunction at every possible occasion our political strength was growing and the personnel of the administration improving in every way. More and more the men connected with us were coming to comprehend the economic questions underlying our agitation... It isn't necessary for Privilege to bribe men with money, with promise, or even with the hope of personal reward, if it can succeed in fooling them. It is this insidious power, this intangible thing which is hard to detect and harder to prove, this indirect influence which is the most dangerous factor today. (Johnson, 1911/1993, pp. 167, 169, 171)

What public administration was to be

For what purpose did the Johnson coterie advocate an expert public administration if not to promote efficiency or to fortify class position? Although each member of the Johnson coterie viewed the expansion of the city government's administrative capacity as a means to an end, they did not share exactly the same vision for these ends. Three alternative goals can be found within their writings: (1) the end of privilege-seeking engendered by the radical separation of the public from the private; (2) the communal achievement of divinely mandated social imperatives as interpreted in the Social Gospel; and (3) the continuation of the American Republic into an era where urban life was replacing rural life as the primary experience for most Americans. Only the considerable will and charisma of Tom Johnson and the adaptive intellectual skills of Frederic Howe produced the appearance of a common intellectual endeavor to expand and legitimize a powerful public administration.

The separation of public service from private enterprise. The separation of public business from private business was seen as necessary because private business interests were using the government to gain "privilege" through tax breaks, tariffs, utilities, patents, and land speculation. At the local level, this was most evidenced by the street railroad companies' co-optation and corruption of municipal government in order to obtain the most favorable franchise agreements.
Informed by the social philosophy of Henry George, the Johnson coterie sought to municipalize all “natural monopolies.” This would eliminate the temptation of private interests to corrupt government. Although they believed that municipal management could be as efficient as private management, they were willing to tolerate inefficiency to achieve honest government.

In addition to municipal ownership, the Johnson coterie sought a single tax on (unimproved) land values. They believed the single tax would end privilege-creating tax laws, yield more tax revenues to support new municipal initiatives, and end private land speculation (a cause of economic inefficiency). Philosophically, they believed that land values were “community-created” and that the land tax was more just than any tax on “earned” wealth. They also believed that removing taxes from other activities would create a more prosperous society.

The establishment of a civil religion. The establishment of a civil religion was seen as necessary because of a perceived inconsistency between public and private morals and a frustration with denominational divisions of American Protestantism. Thus it was through public service that Christians could best practice a Social Gospel ministry.

The unity characteristics of the early Church is found to-day only in the modern city, where there are scores and hundreds of churches but only one government. The sense of brotherhood taught by the early Apostles is now best seen at the ballot box and at the City Hall, where the masses feel as much at home as in the church... Some of the greatest evils in our society to-day are those which only a government supported by the proper public opinion can remove... If Jesus were to appear to-day, He would be quite as likely to find His greatest field of usefulness in the City Hall or the State Capitol as in the temples consecrated to divine worship, great as is the value of the latter. (Bemis, 1909, pp. 106, 108)

Bemis and Cooley assumed a knowable universal Christian ethic and promoted city hall as the common church for all who desire to practice that ethic. They saw public service not as a profession but as a vocation—the priesthood of a new civil religion. Honest public service was a moral imperative. A strong administrative capacity was
necessary to Christianize laissez-faire economics and eliminate the worst evils of capitalism. Among the expansion of powers specifically sought by Bemis and Cooley were the municipalization of both public utilities and social charities. Cooley also worked to transform the purpose of the criminal justice system from punishing criminals to shepherding penitents. Honest, fair, and efficient city government was needed to inspire confidence in the proposed reforms and to nurture universal fellowship based in Christian ethics.

The creation of municipal republics. The creation of municipal republics was inspired by several sources. The cities of America were growing in importance while the administration of cities was notoriously corrupt. Large cities were perceived as a new phenomena not accounted for at the founding of the republic. Citizens were apathetic about their local governments, presumably because these governments were powerless to meet the demands of urbanization. At the same time, there was a divergence of cultures between immigrant urban America and puritan rural America.

The municipal republicans believed cities needed home rule—autonomy from state government—because (1) cities were the most appropriate level for most government decisions, (2) the nature of city charters as state laws was inappropriate, and (3) the codification of rural values into state laws represented an injustice to the urban population. To achieve home rule, they were prepared to make radical changes to the institutional and constitutional government structure.

Municipal republicans believed that an active city government would make citizens interested in local public affairs because the government could act on their desires. Likewise, municipal ownership of public utilities would make government more relevant in the daily lives of citizens. With this increased mutual contact, the municipal government had the opportunity and obligation to better educate the citizenry in its civic duties.

They saw public administration as a mechanism of self-government and a means of nurturing an urban-based republican polity. They often referred to the need for a greater "public spirit," "civic consciousness," "community sense," and even "city sense." They believed an activist city government could foster this republicanism.
Public Administration in the Social Reform Movement

We lack a city sense because we have little to create a city sense. There is nothing to awaken love, affection, interest. The attitude of the people to the state is a reciprocal state of mind born of the state to the citizen. The city has neglected the people, the people in turn have neglected the state. (Howe, 1912, p. 601)

Most municipal republicans wanted power to be concentrated in an elected mayor. Although this was a centralization of authority in order to create effectiveness and accountability, it was seen as a "decentralizing" of decision-making away from the state legislature.

A strong public administration was necessary for two reasons. First it had to carry out the programs desired by the citizens and mandated by the city's chief executive—a strong elected mayor. The competency of the municipal public administration would reflect on the mayor, whom the voters could hold accountable. Thus public administration was not to be independent of the mayor. On the contrary, public administrators were even expected to be in tune with the mayor's ideology. To maintain this connection, personnel decisions were better in the hands of expert managers, appointed by the mayor, than in the hands of civil service commissions.

A strong public administration was also necessary because it shared in the city-republic's mandate to tutor the residents in citizenship. Because public administrators were educated in civics and knowledgeable in public affairs, they were expected to be active in community organizations and political campaigns. The municipal republicans wished to elevate the images of both political activity and public service, which shared a reputation as ignoble and undignified. Banning the political participation of public servants was seen as counter productive. Rather, their ideal was a public administration composed of persons who were both trained experts and exemplary citizens.

Conclusion

At least in the case of social reformers in Cleveland, early public administration development was part of an attempt to transform cities from America's most conspicuous failure in self-government into its most laudable success. In their cultivation of public administration, the ambitions of the Johnson coterie were substantive, not pro-
cedural, and their motivations were moral, not frugal. They believed that improving the quality of life in emerging urban America was dependent on establishing a strong, activist government at the municipal level. A necessary precondition to this was a competent and idealistic local public administration.

Notes

1. The most significant of these texts include: Baker (1915); Bemis (1893, 1901); Cooley (1901, 1911a, 1911b); Howe (1897, 1905); Johnson (1911/1935); and Witt (1899).

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INDEX

A
Abbey, Edward 53
Adams, Ansel 52
administration
roots of 4
Aristotle 35
assumptions 2

B
Baker, Newton D. 71
Bemis, Edward 70
Book of Orders 14, 15
bureaucracy
images of 51

C
Cameralism 30
development of 31
Carson, Rachel 48, 59–62
awards 60
Civil War, English 8
Cleveland social reformers 3
Cleveland, reform in 70–80
common good 36
common wealth 35
Commons, John R. 70
competitive appointments 37
Constitution, American 7
English roots 8
Cooley, Harris 70
Cromwell, Oliver 10

E
ecosystem management 59
Edward III
establishes justice of the
peace 9
Ely, Richard 70
Endangered Species Act 53
Enlightened State 33
environmentalism 52
biocentric 57

F
Forest Reserve Act of 1897 55
Frederick the Great 29, 35
Friedrich Wilhelm I 32
Leaders of American Conservation 52
leadership
administrative 47–63
in environmental movement 62
styles 48
views of 49
Leopold, Aldo 48, 57–59
Forest Service policy influence 58
Locke, John 8

Man and Nature 52
Marsh, George Perkins 52
Marshall, Bob 52
mercantilism 30
Monkey Wrench Gang 53
Muir, John 56
municipal growth 71
municipal republicanism 70

National Conservation Association 56
national forests
growth of 56

organization
social 35

Pinchot, Gifford 48, 55–57
forest management 55
Politics or State-Science 32
INDEX

politics/administration dicotomy 50
polity 30
definitions 30
Poor Law 15
postal service
government control 2
privatization of 2
Powell, John Wesley 48, 53–55
controversy over land survey approach 54
father of irrigation development 54
Privy Council 10, 15
Progressive Era 3
progressive era 69
impact on p.a. 70
*Progressive Fish-Culturist 60*
public administration
and social change 50–52
definitions of 71–79
early modern 30
myths 51
social change and 3
social well-being and 3
*Public Voices*
interest in history 1

**R**

Reclamation Act of 1902 54
reformers
objectives of 72
social 69, 72
structural 69, 71, 72
relationship between ruler and ruled 36

*Report on the Lands of the Arid Region of the United States* 53
Revolution, American 8
Rohr, John 7

**S**

science, and social progress 30
*Sea Around Us, The* 60
SHARE
name change 1
*Silent Spring* 59, 61
Social Gospel 70
state
and science 37
eudaimonic 31, 41
ideal 35
interventions 36
police 31
polity 36
purpose of 35
role of 30
theory 30
welfare 31
Stuart Justices of the Peace 3

**T**

*Theory and Praxis*
symposium 1

**U**

United States
Bureau of Ethnology 48
Bureau of Fisheries 59
environmentalism 52
Fish and Wildlife Service 60
| Forest Service | 48 |
| Geological Survey | 48, 54 |
| **W** |
| Wilderness Society | 52 |
| Wilson, Woodrow |
| 1887 essay | 2 |
| attitude toward Continental system of PA | 7 |
| disparages English system as model | 7 |
| Wisconsin Conservation Com- |
| mission | 58 |
| Witt, Peter | 70 |
| Wolff, Christiaan Von | 29–42 |
| administrative philosophy | 33–38 |
| biography | 31–32 |
| champion of German Enlightenment | 38 |
| core philosophy | 29 |
| influence of | 37–40 |

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